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POLL WORKERS, ELECTION ADMINISTRATION,
AND THE PROBLEM OF IMPLICIT BIAS
Antony Page*
Michael. Pitts**
Racial bias in election administration-more specifically, in the interaction between
poll workers and voters at a polling place on election day-may be implicit, or
unconscious. Indeed, the operation of a polling place may present an "optimal"
setting for unconscious racial bias. Poll workers sometimes have legal discretion to
decide whether or not a prospective voter gets to cast a ballot, and they operate in an
environment where they may have to make quick decisions, based on little
information, with few concrete incentives for accuracy, and with little opportunity to
learn from their errors. Even where the letter of the law does not explicitly allow for
a poll worker to exercise discretion, there is a strong possibility that unconscious bias
could play a role in poll worker decision-making. Wihether a poll workers' discretion
is de jure or de facto, the result may be race-based discrimination between
prospective voters. This Article addresses how unconscious bias may play a role in
the interaction between poll workers and prospective voters and discusses some ways
in which the potential for unconscious bias to operate in America's polling places
may be mitigated.
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INTRODUCTION
When it comes to the administration of democracy in the United
States, there has been a long history of racial discrimination. The Fifteenth
Amendment, guaranteeing the right to vote regardless of race, was passed
just after the Civil War.' But the Fifteenth Amendment's aspirations did
not truly start to be realized until almost a century later after passage of
the Voting Rights Act of 1965.2 In the interim, the "great mass of the
white population intend[ed] to keep the blacks from voting ' 3 through
such invidious devices as grandfather clauses, White primaries, poll taxes,
4gerrymandering, and literacy tests.
Voting-related discrimination, however, is not merely a historical
relic of a different time. In the last few decades, examples abound of vot-
ing-related discrimination against racial and ethnic minorities. Of
particular interest for our present purposes are instances of poll workers
treating prospective voters in a discriminatory manner. Take, for example,
Charleston County, South Carolina, where a federal court found that the
local election commission routinely used poll workers who "caused con-
fusion, intimidated African American voters, and had a tendency to be
condescending to those voters"-even into the 1990s.6 Or, take another
1. U.S. CONsT. amend. XV, § 1.
2. Act of August 6, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 1965 (passed to enforce the
Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and for other purposes).
3. Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475, 488 (1903).
4. Emma Coleman Jordan, Taking Voting Rights Seriously: Rediscovering the Fifteenth
Amendment, 64 NEB. L. REV. 389, 397 (1985). Women have also faced discrimination, in-
cluding the bald-faced denial of their voting rights for many years. See, e.g., Minor v.
Happersett, 88 U.S. 162 (1874) (rejecting a Fourteenth Amendment challenge to Mis-
souri's denial of the right to cast a ballot to women). The Nineteenth Amendment was
ratified in 1920 to guarantee women the right to vote. U.S. CONST. amend XIX. We hope
to examine the impact of unconscious bias on women's exercise of the vote in a subse-
quent piece.
5. We use the National Research Council's definition of discrimination: "(1) dif-
ferential treatment on the basis of race that disadvantages a racial group and (2) treatment
on the basis of inadequately justified factors other than race that disadvantages a racial
group." National Research Council, MEASURING RACIAL DiscRiMiNATION, Panel on Methods
for Assessing Discrimination 4 (Rebecca M. Blank et al., eds., 2004). See generally Thomas
Pettigrew & Marylee C Taylor, Discrimination in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOCIOLOGY 688 (Edgar
F Borgatta & Rhonda J.V, Montgomery, eds., 2000).
6. United States v. Charleston County Council, 316 F Supp. 2d 268, 287 (D.S.C.
2003). The federal district court's findings related to discrimination by poll workers in
Charleston are included in a footnote that spans more than three pages in the federal re-
porter. Id. at 286-290. See also Barry H. Weinberg & Lyn Utrecht, Problems in America's
Polling Places: How Can They Be Stopped, 11 TEMPLE POL. & CirV. RTs. L. REV. 401, 408-09
(2002) (describing how a poll worker in Conecuh County, Alabama, used a racially de-
rogatory term when speaking to African American voters and how "poll workers treated
African American voters very differently from the respectful, helpful way in which they
treated white voters").
recent example from Reading, Pennsylvania, where poll workers made
hostile statements about Latino voters such as: "Dumb Spanish-speaking
people ... I don't know why they're given the right to vote" and imposed
barriers to casting a ballot on Latino voters that were not placed on other
racial or ethnic groups Or, take a report on a recent election issued by
the Asian American Legal Defense and Education Fund that documented
how "[ploll workers made improper or excessive demands for identifica-
tion-often only from Asian American voters.""
Any discussion of voting-related discrimination must frankly ac-
knowledge that intentional discrimination still exists, but even the most
ardent supporter of the modern civil rights movement would have to ad-
mit-at least as it relates to the casting of ballots in polling places-that
such obvious, intentional discrimination in voting is likely to have less
impact than it has had in the past. As one commentator recently noted,
"Bull Connor is dead."9 Indeed, during the recent congressional delibera-
tion regarding extension of certain provisions of the Voting Rights Act,
the evidence of voting-related discrimination was not focused on poll
workers' intentional discrimination at polling places so much as it was
focused on the presence of racially polarized voting by the electorate and
on electoral structures (such as redistricting plans) that inhibit the ability
of minority voters to aggregate their ballots and elect their candidates of
choice.' In this respect, voting mirrors other areas, such as employment
and jury selection, where it is difficult to find relatively clear, direct evi-
dence of intentional discrimination.1'
But racial bias in election administration-more specifically, in the
interaction between poll workers and prospective voters at a polling place
on election day-can be unintentional as well. Massive amounts of re-
search support the notion that people engage in unconscious or implicit
discrimination-that "good people often discriminate and they often
7. United States v. Berks County, Pennsylvania, 277 E Supp. 2d 570, 575 (E.D. Pa.
2003).
8. Asian American Legal Defense and Education Fund, Asian American Access to
Demnocracy in the 2006 Elections 1, available at http://www.aaldef.org/docs/Election_2006_
PeportAALDEF.pdf) (last visited Nov. 30, 2009).
9. Richard L. Hasen, Congressional Power to Renew the Preclearance Provisions of the
Voting Rights Act After Tennessee v. Lane, 66 OHio ST. L.J. 177, 179 (2005). Theophilus
"Bull" Connor, a member of the Ku Klux Klan, was a national symbol of racism in the
civil rights struggles of the 1960s.
10. See generally H. Rep. No. 109-478 (2006).
11. See, e.g., Martha Chamallas, Deepening the Legal Understanding of Bias: On Devalua-
tion and Biased Prototypes, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 747, 753 (2001) (stating that "antidiscrimination
law is inadequate because it targets mainly intentional discrimination, missing the more
prevalent contemporary forms of bias that are often nondeliberate or unconscious" (footnote
omitted)); Antony Page, Batsons Blind-Spot: Unconscious Stereotyping and the Peremnptory Chal-
lenge, 85 B.U. L. REv. 155, 157-58 (2005) (jury selection); Susan Sturm, Second Generation
Employment Discrimnination:A Structural Approach, 101 CotuM. L. REV. 458, 460 (2001) (argu-
ing that deliberate racism has been replaced by other sources of bias).
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discriminate without being aware of it.' 12 Scholars have looked at uncon-
scious bias13 and its impact on the law in various arenas.' 4 One pair of
researchers has even applied unconscious bias to the political choices
made by voters when they step into a voting booth and cast a ballot in
contests involving candidates from different racial and ethnic groups.15
Unconscious bias, however, may not just have implications for the specific
electoral choices made by voters when they step behind the curtain and
into the privacy of the voting booth. Indeed, unconscious bias may pre-
vent a voter from getting into the voting booth and casting a ballot in the
first place.
The operation of a polling place on election day may, in fact, present
an "optimal" setting for unconscious bias to have an impact. In some in-
stances, election law explicitly empowers poll workers with the discretion
to decide whether a prospective voter may cast a ballot. And even when
this is not the case, the nature of polling places on election day often pro-
vides poll workers with defacto discretion over who gets to exercise the
12. See Page, supra note 11, at 160-61.
13. "Unconscious," "implicit" and to a lesser degree "automatic" bias are generally
used synonymously in the psychological and legal literature. As the Project Implicit web-
site puts it, the terms "all refer to mental associations that are so well-established as to
operate without awareness, or without intention, or without control." See Project Implicit,
available at https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/demo/background/faqs.html#faq2 (last
visited Nov. 30, 2009).
14. See, e.g., Jody David Armour, Race Ipsa Loquitur: Of Reasonable Racists, Intelligent
Bayesians, and Involuntary Negrophobes, 46 STA. L. REV. 781 (1994); R. Richard Banks et
al., Discrimination and Implicit Racial Bias in a Racially Unequal Society, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1169
(2006); Debra Lynn Bassett,Judicial Disqualification in the Federal Appellate Courts, 81 IowA L.
REV. 1244 (2002); Deborah W Denno, Crime and Consciousness: Science and Involuntary Acts,
87 MINN. L. REV. 269, 317-338 (2002); see also generally Martha Chamallas, The Architecture
of Bias: Deep Structure in Tort Law, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 463 (1998); Theodore Eisenberg &
Sheri Lynn Johnson, Implicit Racial Attitudes of Death Penalty Lawyers, 53 DEPAUL L. REV.
1539 (2004); Barbara J. Flagg, "Was Blind, but Now I See": White Race Consciousness and the
Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 953 (1993);Jerry Kang & Mahzarin
R. Banaji, Fair Measures:A Behavioral Realist Revision of "Affirmnative Action ", 94 CAL. L. REV.
1063 (2006); Justin D. Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality: Implicit Bias, Decisionmaking, and
Misremembering, 57 DuIE L.J. 345 (2007); Sherri Lynn Johnson, Unconscious Racism and the
Criminal Law, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 1016 (1998); Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of
Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportu-
nity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1995); Antony Page, Unconscious Bias and the Limits of Director
Independence, 2009 ILLINOIs L. REV. 237; Page, supra note 11; Reshma M. Saujani, "The
Implicit Association Test": A Measure of Unconscious Racism in Legislative Decision-Making, 8
MICH.J. RACE & L. 395 (2003); Robert G. Schwemm, Why Do Landlords Still Discriminate
(And WMat Can Be Done About It)?, 40J. MARSHALL L. REV. 455, 500-07 (2007). For exten-
sive recent discussion see Unconscious Discrimination Twenty Years Later, 40 CONN. L. REV. 927
(2008) and Behavioral Realism, 94 CAL. L. REV. 969 (2006).
15. See Gregory S. Park & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Better Metric: The Role of Uncon-
scious Race and Gender Bias in the 2008 Presidential Race, Cornell Legal Studies Research
Paper No. 08-007, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfi?abstract-id =
1102704 (last visited Nov. 30, 2009).
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franchise. Moreover, poll workers operate in an environment where they
may have to make quick decisions, based on little information, with few
concrete incentives for accuracy, and with minimum opportunity to learn
from their errors. Research shows that all these factors may serve to exac-
erbate the impact of unconscious bias.
The most obvious manner in which unconscious bias can manifest
itself in a polling place occurs when poll workers have discretion to make
judgments about whether a particular voter possesses the necessary quali-
fications to cast a ballot. An excellent example of this type of discretion
(and one we describe in more detail later on) can be found in Indiana's
high-profile, controversial16 law requiring prospective voters on election
day to present government-issued photo identification.' 7 Opponents of
photo identification have primarily worried about the disparate impact
photo identification will have on certain categories of voters, including
African Americans, because those voters are less likely to possess photo
identification.'8 As such, opponents of this requirement have asserted that
state officials adopted Indiana's law (and similar laws in other states, such
as Georgia, Missouri, and Arizona) for an unconstitutional (i.e., inten-
tional) discriminatory purpose.' 9 Opponents have, however, failed to focus
sharply2 on the fact that Indiana's law grants discretion to poll workers to
16. Indiana's photo identification law was upheld in Crawford v. Marion Election Bd.,
No. 07-21, slip. op. (U.S. 2008). The controversial, high-profile nature of the litigation be-
comes clear when one considers the large number of arnicus briefs filed in the Supreme
Court. A total of 39 amicus briefs were filed; 23 filed on behalf of the petitioners in the
case, 15 filed on behalf of the respondents, and one filed in support of neither party. See
Michael J. Pitts, Te Amicus Briefs in the Indiana Voter Identification Case: I Read ... So You
Don't Have To, Election Law @ Moritz, available at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/
comments/articles.php?lD=227 (last visited Nov. 30, 2009).
17. Ohio State's Dan Tokaji has recognized that photo identification laws grant
discretion to poll workers and that such discretion can lead to discriminatory treatment.
See Daniel P. Tokaji, Early Returns on Election Reform: Discretion, Disfranchisement, and the
Help America Vote Act, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1206, 1233 (2005) ("The lack of specific
standards leaves discretion in the hands of local election officials and poll workers, and may
result in the dissimilar treatment of similarly situated individuals from county to county-
or even from precinct to precinct."). However, while Professor Tokaji recognizes the possi-
bility of discriminatory treatment, he does not focus on whether unconscious bias may be
the cause of that discriminatory treatment.
18. See generally Matt A. Barreto et al., The Disproportionate Impact of Indiana Voter ID
Requirements on the Electorate, 7, available at http://depts.washington.edu/uwiser/
documents/Indiana-voter.pdf (last visited Nov. 30, 2009).
19. See, e.g., Brief for Amicus Curiae Mexican American Legal Defense and Educa-
tional Fund in Support of Petitioners, Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 553 U.S.
181 (2008) No. 07-21, at 2 (suggesting that Arizona's voter identification law was "moti-
vated by discriminatory animus").
20. It is true that opponents of photo identification objected to Indiana's law, in
part, because of the vague way in which the statute might be interpreted, but they did not
describe how this vagueness may create the opportunity for unconscious bias. Indiana De-
mocratic Party v. Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d 775,835-38 (S.D. Ind. 2006).
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accept or reject a prospective voter depending on whether the name on
the photo identification "conforms" 2' to the name on the registration list
and that this discretion could invite unconscious bias into poll worker
determinations of voter eligibility.
22
Even where the law does not explicitly allow poll workers to exer-
cise discretion, a strong possibility still exists for unconscious bias to play a
role during the interaction between prospective voters and poll workers.23
For example, when a prospective voter walks into a polling place, poll
workers typically must search a list to find the voter's name. In most in-
stances, poll workers easily find the name. In some instances, however, poll
workers have difficulty finding a name on a registration list and uncon-
scious bias might play a role in how diligently poll workers search (thirty
seconds, one minute, five minutes?) to find the name.24 Or take the con-
cept of provisional balloting, which, in theory, is supposed to occur when
a poll worker during a federal election cannot locate a voter's name on
the registration list.2 In practice, though, not every voter who should re-
26
ceive a provisional ballot gets one. Moreover, for a voter to cast a
21. IND. CODE § 3-5-2-40.5 (2006) (setting forth requirements for photo identifica-
tion). In a nutshell, the photo identification requirement does not require an exact
match-if the name on the photo identification of a prospective voter is J. Smith and the
name on the registration list is Jim Smith, then the voter might be able to cast a ballot
depending on the poll worker's judgment regarding whether the name on the photo iden-
tification adequately "conforms" to the name on the list. Thus, photo identification gives
poll workers the ability to make judgment calls as to who gets to cast a ballot. A fuller
description of Indiana's photo identification law appears infra Part I.B.
22. Technically, a voter whose name does not "conform" should still get to cast a
ballot-albeit a provisional one. However, there are many potential flaws with provisional
balloting and these potential flaws are discussed in the next paragraph and infra Part I.B.
23. Although we cannot definitively establish the cause of poll workers' erroneous
interpretations of law, it is clear that misapplication of the law by poll workers occurs and
that sometimes such misapplication has a disproportionate impact on particular racial
groups. See, e.g., AALDEF, supra note 8, at 1 (concluding that poll workers "misapplied
HAVA's ID requirements").
24. Returning to voter identification for a moment, it is worth noting that uncon-
scious bias could have implications for any voter identification law-not just a photo
identification law that gives dejure discretion to poll workers. In essence, no matter what
the actual identification requirements are, in practice, poll workers have defacto discretion
in the application of voter identification rules such that "they might ignore the rule alto-
gether, or they might ask for identification even when the law does not require it or when
they are forbidden from doing so." See Stephen Ansolabehere, Access Versus Integrity in Voter
Identification Requirements, 63 NYU ANN. SoRV. OF AM. L. 613,615 (2008).
25. 42 U.S.C. § 15482 (2009) (allowing for provisional balloting in the event that an
individual's name "does not appear on the official list of eligible voters for the polling
place").
26. One high-profile example of this phenomenon occurred when a group of eld-
erly nuns was turned away from a polling place without being offered provisional ballots.
Deborah Hastings, Nun working Ind. poll turns fellow sisters away for lacking photo ID under
state's new law, A.P. NEws, May 6, 2008, available at http://talkingpointsmemo.com/news/
2008/05/indiana-nunslacking-iddenied.php (last visited Nov. 30,2009).
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provisional ballot, poll workers often must fill out paperwork and, if the
paperwork is not correctly filled out, the provisional ballot may ultimately
be rejected. So it is a distinct possibility that the ostensibly non-
discretionary decision to offer a provisional ballot and the poll worker's
attentiveness to the proper administration of provisional ballots could be
affected by unconscious bias.27
Given the risk that unconscious bias affects the interaction between
prospective voters and poll workers, there are several responses that legis-
lators and election administrators might consider to mitigate the impact
of unconscious bias. 28 These responses take two forms. The first type of
response would aim to affect poll workers on the individual level. Indeed,
there may be some relatively simple actions that could be taken, such as
having poll workers begin every election day by taking an oath not to
discriminate on the basis of race, that might make it less likely that indi-
vidual poll workers would engage in unconscious discrimination. The
second type of response would aim at the institutional or structural level
of America's polling places, primarily in an effort to limit the role poll
workers play on election day. Here, a broad-based reform like vote-by-
mail might help to offset the impact of unconscious bias because vote-by-
mail eliminates the need for poll workers.
After describing how polling places generally operate and delving
into some additional specifics about Indiana's photo identification law
(Part I), we review the research related to unconscious bias. Following a
brief explanation of how unconscious bias operates, we set forth why
America's polling places provide a setting that may aggravate the possibil-
ity of unconscious bias (Part II). Finally, we turn to the implications of
unconscious bias for the interaction between poll workers and prospective
voters and discuss some possible ways to mitigate unconscious bias in the
nation's polling places (Part Ill).
I.THE NATURE OF POLLING PLACES IN AMERICA:
INDIANA (AND ITS PHOTO IDENTIFICATION LAW)
As MODEL
Unconscious bias likely plays a role in the interaction between poll
workers and prospective voters in America's polling places on election day.
To fully understand unconscious bias's impact, though, it is necessary to
27. It is important to note early on that unconscious bias can serve not only to
exclude qualified African Americans from casting a ballot-it could also serve to allow un-
qualified White voters to cast a regular ballot. In both cases the concern is similarly
situated potential voters being treated differently.
28. A number of the proposals we suggest infra Part III as a way to mitigate uncon-
scious bias, such as election-day voter registration, are election reforms that have been
suggested for other reasons, such as to increase voter turnout. Thus, unconscious bias may
serve as an additional justification for some of these reforms.
FALL 2009] Poll Workers
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describe how polling places typically operate. In the United States, no
single standard exists for how polling places function. 9 Federal laws gov-
erning the operation of polling places are relatively limited. Indeed, until
enactment of the Help America Vote Act in 2002,30 there were virtually
no federal laws that directly governed the actual operation of polling
places at federal elections. While the National Voter Registration Act 3' and
the Voting Rights Act 32 have had a modest impact on the operation of
polling places through changes in registration rules and the enforcement
of anti-discrimination principles, the majority of enforcement related to
these acts has not been directly related to the mechanics of how a polling
place operates on election day.33 In short, the operation of polling places
varies from state to state, from county to county, and can even vary from
34precinct to precinct within the same county.
That said, the fact remains that when a prospective voter walks into a
polling place in the United States, is greeted by a poll worker, and casts a
ballot, a relatively similar process occurs-even if differences in detail exist.
Thus, to provide a more concrete discussion of the issue, we will focus here
on one state's set of election laws-the state of Indiana. Indiana provides a
useful springboard for discussion both because it is fairly typical and be-
cause it is unique. Indiana is typical in the way it runs its polling places in
that the process of casting a ballot in a polling place does not vary enor-
29. See generally ALEC EWALD, THE WAY WE VoTE (2009) (describing the diversity of
practices used in American elections).
30. Help AmericaVote Act of 2002, Pub.L. No. 107-252 (2002).
31. NationalVoter Registration Act of 1993, Pub.L. No. 103-31 (1993).
32. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 et. seq (2006).
33. See, e.g., Daniel P. Tokaji, The New Vote Denial: Where Election Reform Meets the
Voting Rights Act, 57 S.C. L. REv. 689, 692 (2006) (describing how a body ofjurisprudence
has not developed regarding the application of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act to vote
denial). Perhaps the biggest exception to this statement is theVoting Rights Act's mandate
that certain jurisdictions provide election materials in polling places (such as voting in-
structions) and assistance (i.e., poll worker assistance) in languages other than English. 42
U.S.C. § 1973b(f)(4); 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-la (2009). Another exception is Section 208 of
the Voting Rights Act that allows a voter to, within certain limits, receive assistance at the
polls from the person of that voter's choosing. 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-6 (2009). Section 5 of
the Voting Rights Act also mandates that certain jurisdictions submit any changes related
to how polling places operate so the federal government can ensure these changes have
not been adopted with a discriminatory purpose and will not have a retrogressive dis-
criminatory effect on minority voters. 42 U.S.C. § 1973e (2009). Finally, in some
situations, the Voting Rights Act also allows federal officials to monitor polling places on
election day to ensure that discrimination does not occur against racial and ethnic minori-
ties. 42 U.S.C. 5 1973f (2006).
34. Indeed, polling places often differ within states because, for example, different
machinery to cast and count ballots may be used in different counties or cities. Moreover,
even polling places within a single government unit (i.e., a particular county) may operate
differently. For example, one of the authors recently collected provisional ballot forms used
by poll workers at polling places and discovered that in some instances within the same
county different forms were used in different precincts.
[VOL. 15:1
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mously from most other polling places throughout the United States.When
most prospective voters enter a polling place anywhere in America, they
identify themselves to the poll worker, the poll worker checks the voter
registration list to ensure eligibility, and the voter then casts a ballot-unless
some problem or issue arises .3 And that is, essentially, what occurs in Indi-
ana. On the other hand, Indiana is unique in that it is one of less than a
handful of states that absolutely require voters to identify themselves using a
government-issued photo identification.
This discussion of Indiana's polling places is meant to emphasize two
points central to our thesis. First, the basic structure and operation of Indi-
ana's polling places shows how critical poll workers are to a voter's ability to
cast a countable ballot. At virtually every step of the election process, a
voter's "fate" is in the hands of poll workers, regardless of what the law says.
Second, the design of Indiana's photo identification law demonstrates how
some election laws explicitly place discretion in the hands of poll workers.36
A. A Brief Sketch of "hat (Should) Happen on Election Day in Indiana
Indiana has more than 5,000 voting precincts throughout the state
that open at 6 a.m. and close at 6 p.m. on election day37 and are staffed by a
cadre of up to nine poll workers 8.3 Each precinct has a "precinct election
board" that consists of three poll workers-two "judges" and one "inspec-
tor. 3 9 The inspector is the poll worker in charge of the overall management
of the precinct-essentially the precinct "boss.",40 The duties of the inspector
include, among other things, checking photo identifications and challeng-
ing voters who do not have valid photo identification. The election judges
35. It is worth noting that in several states prospective voters may register to vote on
election day.We discuss election-day registration infra Part III.B.
36. The design of Indiana's photo identification law is important beyond Indiana for
a couple of reasons. First, photo identification in general is being considered by other
states. See, e.g., Terrence Stutz, Texas Senate at odds over voter ID legislation, two-thirds rule,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS (Jan. 14, 2009);Jake Grovum, GOP Legislators Want Photo IDsfor
Voting In Minnesota, MINNE"OLIS STAR-TRIBUNE (Jan. 26, 2009). Second, because Indiana's
law has now been upheld by the United States Supreme Court, it may well serve as a
model that other states will adopt in an effort to minimize the possible success of future
legal challenges.
37. IND. CODE § 3-11-8-8 (2006) (setting forth polling place hours). Because Indi-
ana is partly on central time and partly on eastern time not all polling places are open
simultaneously.
38. Indiana Election Division, 2008 Election Administrator's Manual 52 (2008).
39. IND. CODE § 3-6-6-1 (2006).
40. The inspector is appointed by the county chairperson of the major political
party whose candidate for the office of secretary of state received the highest vote in the
county at the last election. IND. CODE 5 3-6-6-8 (2006) (nomination of inspector by
county chair). The appointment is subject to final approval by the county election board.
IND. CODE § 3-6-6-11(a) (2006).
Poll Workers
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are also, among other things, charged with checking photo identifications
and challenging voters who do not have a valid identification; in addition,
the judges also are responsible for assisting voters with disabilities. 1 Many
precincts also have poll clerks who are in charge of"ballot control," such as
managing the poll books and handing out ballots.4 2 In addition, assistant
poll clerks 3 and sheriffs may serve at the polls.
Poll workers' impact on elections can be enormous. As one com-
mentator has generally observed, "Poll workers perform many important
tasks that ensure elections are administered smoothly; they set up voting
equipment, check voters against registration rolls, assist voters with some-
times complicated voting procedures, and close up shop at day's end. 44 In
Indiana, poll workers must make sure each voting booth (and any voting
equipment, such as electronic machines) is properly operating.45 Poll
workers are also the persons with whom prospective voters will most
closely interact during their time at the polls. Indeed, in Indiana, voters
may not lawfully communicate with anyone except a poll worker while at
the polls. 46 Poll workers make decisions about who may cast a ballot, in-
cluding who may cast a "regular" ballot and who may cast a provisional
ballot, because they, as members of the precinct election board, are
charged with resolving all challenges to a prospective voter's eligibility.
47
41. Each chair of a major political party gets to appoint one of the judges; in other
words, the local Democratic Party chair gets to appoint one judge and the local Republi-
can Party chair gets to appoint the other judge. InD. CODE § 3-6-6-1 (c) (2006)
(nomination by county chair). The appointment is subject to the approval of the county
election board. IND. CODE . 3-6-6-11 (a) (2006).
42. Unless the county election board adopts a resolution to the contrary, each pre-
cinct also has two poll clerks and each chair of a major political party nominates one of
the clerks. IND. CODE § 3-6-6-38 (2006) (ability of county election board to eliminate the
position of poll clerk); IND. CODE § 3-6-6-2 (2006) (nomination of poll clerk by county
chair). The nominations are subject to approval by the county election board. IND. CODE
3-6-6-11(a) (2006).
43. Each county election board has the discretion to appoint two assistant poll
clerks and, again, each county chair of a major political party nominates one of the assis-
tant poll clerks subject to the approval of the county election board IND. CODE § 3-6-6-3
(2006) (nomination of assistant poll clerk by county chair); IND. CODE § 3-6-6-11(a)
(2006) (approval of nomination by county election board).
44. Matthew Corritore, Redefining "hat It Means to Be a Poll Worker, AEI/Brookings
Election Reform Project (July 2, 2008), available at http://www.electionreformproject.org/
Resources/8c6cO74e-2e42-4e2f-929 1 -a2e9cO4ad32a/rI /Detail.aspx (last visited Nov. 30,
2009).
45. 2008 Indiana Election Day Handbook 25 (rev. 2007) (detailing the steps poll
workers should take to ensure the balloting equipment is properly functioning).
46. IND. CODE § 3-11-8-18 (2006) ("A voter or person offering to vote may not
converse or communicate with a person other than a member of the precinct election
board while at the polls.").
47. IND. CODE § 3-6-6-30 (2006) ("Each precinct election board shall determine all
questions of challenge and all other matters coming before the board.").
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In other words, they are on-the-spot arbiters of state law.48 And poll work-
ers are also responsible for assisting and instructing voters when assistance
is requested.49
There are several steps in the process of casting a ballot that occur
when a prospective voter arrives at a polling place. Upon arrival, the pro-
spective voter must provide his or her name to the poll workers and the
poll workers must find the name in the poll book, which, in theory, lists
each registered voter.50 The prospective voter must then present identifica-
tion. In Indiana, there are actually two separate voter identification
requirements. First, with only very limited exceptions, persons presenting
themselves at the polling place on election day must present a photo
identification. 51 Second, certain first-time voters must present one of the
pieces of identification required by the federal Help AmericaVote Act. s2 If
the poll workers find the prospective voter's name on the registration list,
the prospective voter satisfies all identification requirements, and no one
otherwise challenges the eligibility of the prospective voter to cast a bal-
lot, the prospective voter then signs the poll book, confirms that the
address in the poll book is correct, and proceeds to cast a regular ballot.53
Indeed, this is how the voting process goes for the vast majority of per-
sons who present themselves at polling places on election day.
There are, however, many other possibilities that could lead to a pro-
spective voter being unable to cast a regular ballot. Momentarily putting
aside a lack of necessary identification, a number of problems can arise for
a prospective voter. For instance, the prospective voter's name might not
appear in the poll book for any number of reasons, including an error in
the registration process by election officials, a name change by the pro-
spective voter (e.g., because of marriage or divorce)54 or because the
prospective voter failed to register. If the prospective voter's name does
48. There is, essentially, very little a voter in Indiana can do to challenge the deter-
mination of the precinct election board on election day itself. In contrast, the state of New
Jersey has codified a procedure that allows a voter to challenge poll workers' denial of a
ballot in a streamlined judicial proceeding. N.J.S.A. § 19:15-18.3 (2009). See also Frank
Askin, A View from the Trenches: Telling It To the Judge on Election Day, N.J. LAw, Aug. 2008 at
44.
49. IND. CODE § 3-6-6-30 (2006).
50. Indiana Election Day Handbook, supra note 45, at 15.
51. IND. CODE 5 3-11-8.25.1(a) (2006) ("[A] voter who desires to vote an official
ballot at an election shall provide proof of identification.").
52. IND, CODE § 3-7-33-4.5 (2006).The requirement of first-time voters to present
some form of identification stems from a federal mandate included in the Help America
Vote Act. 42 U.S.C. 5 15483(b)(1)(A) (2009).
53. Indiana Election Day Handbook, supra note 45, at 15, 18-19.
54. In the event that the poll workers determine that a name change has occurred,
the prospective voter is supposed to be directed to complete an affidavit stating that he or
she has undergone a name change. The prospective voter is then supposed to sign the poll
book with the new name and then vote a regular ballot.
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not appear in the poll book, poll workers must try to determine if the
prospective voter fits into any of the "fail-safe" procedures that would still
allow the voter to cast a "regular" ballot."5 If the prospective voter does
not fit one of the fail-safe options, then poll workers are supposed to offer
the prospective voter the opportunity to cast a provisional ballot. 6
Even if the prospective voter's name appears in the poll book, a pro-
spective voter can be challenged by a poll worker or a challenger
appointed by a political party 7 for any number of reasons, including the
prospective voter's failure to: provide valid identification, 8 have a signature
matching the one appearing in the poll book, 9 reside in the precinct (i.e.,
a change in the prospective voter's address), be 18 years old at the time of
the general election, or be a United States citizen. An additional basis in
a primary election is the failure of the prospective voter to be a member
of the political party for which he or she is casting a ballot.6 ' When a pro-
spective voter is challenged, the person making the challenge must fill out
an affidavit stating the reason for the challenge.62 The prospective voter
then has an opportunity to submit what might be termed a "counter-
affidavit" in which the prospective voter affirms his or her eligibility to
63vote. After these affidavits are completed, the prospective voter casts a
provisional ballot.
6 4
Poll workers are thus often the key in determining whether a pro-
spective voter gets to cast a regular ballot that automatically gets counted
in the final tally. Importantly, if a regular ballot does not get cast, the op-
55. Indiana Election Day Handbook, supra note 45, at 15-18.
56. Id. at 23.
57. IND. CODE 5 3-11-8-20 (2006). Technically, in Indiana, the challenge cannot be
made by just any poll worker, but must come from a member of the three-person precinct
election board. During a primary election, a challenge may also be lodged by a voter who
is a member of the political party whose ballot is being requested by the prospective voter.
IND. CODE § 3-10-1-10 (2006).
58. IND. CODE § 3-11-8-25.1(c) (2006).
59. IND. CODE § 3-11-8-25.1(i) (2006).
60. Indiana Election Day Handbook, supra note 45, at 21. A prospective voter's ad-
dress may not be the same as that on the list because he or she has moved and not updated
his or her registration. If that occurs and the prospective voter has moved in the 30 days
prior to the election, the prospective voter fills out a form and casts a regular ballot. If the
prospective voter moved more than 30 days before the election, the choices for poll work-
ers become a little more complicated. If the prospective voter has moved within the same
precinct, the prospective voter writes his or her new address in the poll book and votes a
regular ballot. If the prospective voter has moved to a different precinct in the same con-
gressional district in the same county, he or she fills out a form and casts a regular ballot.
However, if the prospective voter has moved out of the county or out of the congressional
district, he or she may only cast a provisional ballot that will not be counted. Id. at 20.
61. IND. CODE § 3-10-1-9 (2006).
62. IND. CODE § 3-11-8-20; 3-11-8-21 (2006).
63. IND. CODE § 3-11-8-23 (2006).
64. IND. CODE § 3-11-8-23.5 (2006).
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portunity to cast a countable ballot decreases significantly. When a pro-
spective voter cannot cast a regular ballot that individual is supposed to be
able to cast a provisional ballot. However, provisional balloting is not fool-
proof. Poll workers will sometimes fail to offer a provisional ballot to the
prospective voter or the prospective voter will refuse to go through the
lengthy process of filling out a provisional ballot .6 Moreover, even if the
poll workers offer a provisional ballot and the prospective voter takes the
time to fill it out, errors can occur in the process. The paperwork accom-
panying provisional ballots is often incomplete, resulting in the possibility
of the provisional ballot not being counted.67 Indeed, in a typical election
in Indiana, less than half of the provisional ballots cast ultimately get in-
cluded in the final tally of votes.
68
The most critical job of poll workers (at least in relation to their in-
teraction with prospective voters) is undoubtedly determining voter
eligibility, including which voters will be offered a provisional ballot.
However, the importance of poll workers also extends into the voting
booth itself. For example, in Indiana (as in many places), voters are techni-
cally only allowed to spend a certain amount of time in the voting
booth-three minutes in a primary election and two minutes in a general
election.6 9 After this time period, poll workers are supposed to remove the
voter from the booth . While in theory this is an unambiguous rule, it is
not clear that poll workers actually enforce this rule in any systematic
65. Supra note 26 (news story about nuns in South Bend). For an example of poll
workers failing to offer provisional ballots elsewhere, see AALDEF, Asian American Civil
Rights Group Reports Widespread Voter Problems on Election Day (Nov. 2, 2004), available at
http://www.aaldef.org/article.php?article-id=184 (last visited Nov. 30, 2009) (reporting
that at the 2004 general election in New York City, Asian American voters whose names
were not found on the registration list were not offered provisional ballots).
66. Michael J. Pitts, Empirically Assessing the Impact of Photo Identification at the Polls
Through An Examination of Provisional Balloting, 24 J. L. & POL. 475, 502 (2008) (describing
provisional ballot that was not completed because voter did not have time to complete the
necessary paperwork).
67. Id. at 502. Cf ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, PROVISIONAL VOTING: FAIL-SAFE OR TRAP-
DOOR TO DISENFRANCHISEMENT? 5 (2008) ("[W]hen voters were permitted to vote
provisionally, most poll workers did not assist voters in ensuring their ballots were com-
plete and properly submitted.").
68. ELECTION AsSISTANCE COMMISSION, THE 2006 ELECTION ADMINISTRATION AND
VOTING SURVEY 19 (2007) (table showing less than half of Indiana's provisional ballots cast
at the November 2006 election were counted); Pitts, supra note 66, at 499 (showing at
May 2008 primary election, less than 30 percent of the provisional ballots cast were
counted). Nationwide, the rate of counting provisional ballots is a bit higher, but there are
significant variations from state to state.
69. IND. CODE§ 3-11-11-10.5(a)-(b) (2006).
70. IND. CODE 3 -11-11-10.5(c) (2006).
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way.7 So poll worker decisions about enforcement of this rule can play a
role in a voter's ability to cast a full and complete ballot.
Moreover, the importance of poll workers while the voter is casting
a ballot goes beyond enforcing time limits. For instance, voters who are
elderly or disabled may need assistance in the operation of voting equip-
ment. In such an instance, poll workers may play a couple of key roles.72
First, any prospective voter is allowed to choose just about any person to
assist them in the polling place. 3 However, as is the case with enforce-
ment of time limits in the voting booth, past experience indicates poll
workers do not always allow voters to make an unfettered choice in rela-
tion to assistance. 74 Second, a prospective voter may choose to have poll
• 75
workers provide assistance. In such an instance, the two election judges
(who represent different political parties) are supposed to assist the voter
in casting the ballot. 6
In the final analysis, poll workers are "critical elements of the elec-
tion system" who "decide whether the voter can even cast a ballot."
'
"7
From the opening to the closing of the polls, poll workers represent the
78key to the experience of voters on election day. As one election official
has succinctly stated: "On Election Day, the poll worker is God. 79
B. Indiana's Controversial Photo Identification Law
Poll workers play a vital role in the election day balloting process,
but in Indiana they play an especially critical role in implementing the
state's ground-breaking photo identification system. In 2005, on a strict
71. For instance, one of the authors has voted several times in Indiana and has never
seen poll workers clocking voters on a stop-watch.
72. Indiana Election Day Handbook, supra note 45, at 26 (describing how elderly
and disabled voters may have needs that are distinct from other voters).
73. IND. CODE § 3-11-9-2(a) (2006); 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-6 (2009).
74. To the best of our knowledge, no litigation has been brought in Indiana alleging
a violation of Section 208 of the Voting Rights Act. However, poll worker refusals to allow
voters to choose the "assistors of their choice" have been the subject of litigation in other
jurisdictions. See United States Department ofJustice, Civil Rights Division, Voting Section
Litigation, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/voting/litigation/caselist.php (last visited
Nov. 30, 2009) (listing cases raising claims under Section 208).
75. IND. CODE § 3-11-9-3 (2006).
76. IND. CODE § 3-11-9-3(c) (2006).
77. Thad Hall et al., Poll Workers and the Vitality of Democracy:An Early Assessment, PS:
POLITICAL SCIENCE & POLITICS 40.4 647,647-54 (2007).
78. R. Michael Alvarez, et al., 2008 SuRvEv OF THE PERFORMANCE OF AMERICAN
ELECTIONS FINAL REPORT 17 (2009) ("The volunteer army of poll workers is often viewed
as the critical link in making voting work.").
79. Matthew Waring & David Waterman, Poll Workers: The Forgotten Side of Election
Reform?, AEI/Brookings Election Reform Project (Sept. 3, 2008), available at http://
www.electionreformproject.org/Resources/dc058082-a778-435e-8bd3-81135a5cb44c/rl/
Detail.aspx (last visited Nov. 30, 2009).
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party-line vote,80 the Indiana legislature adopted a new system for verify-
ing the identity of prospective voters who present themselves at polling
places on election day.81 The 2005 law replaced a system where prospec-
tive voters who presented themselves at Indiana's polling places would
only have to identify themselves through the process of signature match-
ing.8
In contrast, under the system of voter identification passed by the
state legislature in 2005-a system that may be the most stringent in the
United States 8-when a prospective voter enters a polling place on elec-
tion day, a poll worker must ask the prospective voter to show photo
identification before the prospective voter is allowed to sign his or her
name in the poll book.8" But not just any photo identification, such as an
employer identification, will suffice. The photo identification must have
certain qualities. For starters, the photo identification must have been is-
sued by either the state of Indiana or the United States Government.85 In
addition to being government-issued, the photo identification must have
an expiration date. While the law does not specify exact types of photo
identification necessary, the most common forms of photo identification
that meet these requirements are either an Indiana driver's license or an
80. Mary Beth Schneider, House Oks Strict Voter ID Bill, INDIANAPOLIS STAR (March
22, 2008); Mary Beth Schneider, Voter ID law loonmingfor Hoosiers, INDIANAPOLIS STAR (April
13, 2005).The legislation was signed by Governor Mitch Daniels.
81. Senate Enrolled Act No. 438, Pub. L. No. 109(2005).
82. Signature matching is still an aspect of voter identification in Indiana's polling
places. If a voter's signature on the poll book does not match the signature on the county's
registration records, then the voter can be challenged. IND. CODE § 3-11-8-25.1(i) (2006);
Indiana Election Day Handbook, supra note 45, at 21. There does not appear to be any
empirical evidence regarding the number of persons who were challenged for lack of a
signature match either before or after the implementation of photo identification. How-
ever, a report from one of the larger counties in Indiana indicated that problems with
signature matching are "rare to nonexistent" in elections where photo identification has
been used. TIPPECANOE CouNTY BD. OF ELECTIONS AND REGISTRATION, TIPPECANOE
COuNTY GENERAL ELECTION 2008 21-22 (2008).
83. Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., No. 07-21, slip. op. at 5 (U.S. 2008)
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (describing Indiana's law as "impos[ing] a significantly harsher, un-
justified burden" than voter identification laws in other states).
84. IND. CODE § 3-11-8-25.1(b) (2006). Admittedly, one has to recognize that elec-
tion administration by poll workers tends to be imperfect and what actually occurs in one
of the thousands of Indiana precincts at any given time may not correspond to the exact
letter of the law as written in the Code.
85. IND. CODE 5 3-5-2-40.5 (2006) (defining proof of identification); IND. CODE
§ 3-11-8.25.1(a) (2006) ("[A] voter who desires to vote an official ballot at an election
shall provide proof of identification.").
86. IND. CODE § 3-5-2-40.5(1) (2006). The photo identification will be accepted if
it is not expired or if the identification expired after the date of the most recent general
election. In essence, this rule creates a small window of opportunity for a prospective voter
to use an expired identification.
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Indiana state identification card. In addition, United States passports and
military identifications might also commonly be used."7
It is not enough, howeverjust to have a photo identification with an
expiration date that has been issued by the state of Indiana or the federal
government-the name on the identification must also "conform" to the
name on the poll list. 88 And this aspect of Indiana's law amounts to one of
the key factors related to unconscious bias because the statute does not
provide a specific definition of the word "conform." Indeed, according to
a memorandum from the Indiana Election Division, "[a] common ques-
tion regarding this requirement [that the name conform] is whether this
requires that the name on the Photo ID be identical, or merely similar, to
the name on the poll book.' 89
The Indiana Secretary of State and the Indiana Election Division
have published some guidance-both in the Election Day Handbook
provided for poll workers and in a memo issued just prior to the May 6,
2008, primary election-for poll workers on how to determine whether a
name on a photo identification "conforms" to the name in the poll
book.9° According to state election officials, the term "conform" does not
require the name on the photo identification to "match identically" the
name in the poll book.9' What this interpretation means is that a person
who uses a "common" nickname as a substitute for their given first name
should be allowed to cast a regular ballot; a person who substitutes their
middle name for their given first name should be allowed to cast a regular
ballot; a person who substitutes a "common" nickname for their middle
name as a substitute for their given first name should be allowed to cast a
regular ballot; a person who substitutes the initial for their given first
name should be allowed to cast a regular ballot; and a person who substi-
87. Indiana Election Day Handbook, supra note 45, at 10. If it contains a photo-
graph and a valid expiration date, a college student identification (or any other such state-
issued identification) can also be employed by the prospective voter. Memorandum from
Co-Counsels, Indiana Election Division on Photo ID Interpretations at 3-4 (2006) available
at http://www.in.gov/sos/elections/pdfs/PhotolDAdvisory_-4-30..06.pdf (last visited Nov.
30, 2009). State schools in Indiana include Indiana University, Purdue University, Indiana
State, Ball State, Ivy Tech, University of Southern Indiana, andVincennes. Id. at 4.
88. IND. CODE § 3-5-2-40.5(1) (2006).
89. Memorandum from Co-Counsels, Indiana Election Division on Photo ID In-
terpretations at 1 (May 1, 2006), available at http://www.unionl.org/badforindiana/PDF%
20Files/voterinfo/PhotolDAdvisory-4-30_ 06.pdf (last visited Nov. 7, 2009).
90. Indiana Election Day Handbook, supra note 45, at 10.
91. Id. Why not? Because the dictionary defines the term "conform" as "to be simi-
lar or identical," the legislature could have easily chosen to use the words "exact" or
"identical" in place of the word "conform" and chose not to do so, and interpreting the
term "conform" to mean "similar" rather than "identical" is consistent with the general
rule in Indiana to interpret election law "liberally in favor of the electors." Memorandum
from Co-Counsels, supra note 89, at 1-2.
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tutes the initial for their given middle name should be allowed to cast a
regular ballot.
92
Of course, this guidance from state officials remains quite abstract
and certainly has the ability to make one's head spin. Thus, to illustrate the
types of names on a photo identification that would "conform" to the
name on the poll list, state officials have provided examples for poll work-
ers. According to state officials, the following are examples of names that
would conform to "Robert John Crew": 93
Robert John Crew Bob John Crew
Robert J. Crew Bob J. Crew
Robert Crew Bob Crew
R. John Crew John Crew
R. J. Crew J. Crew
These examples, however, fail to give poll workers a clear indication of
when a name on a photo identification conforms to that in the poll book.94
92. Id. at 2; Indiana Election Day Handbook, supra note 45, at 10.
93. Id.
94. Issues can also arise as to what constitutes an expiration date for purposes of com-
plying with photo identification. For instance, prior to the May 6, 2008, primary election, a
question arose as to whether photo identifications issued to students at Purdue University (a
state school) contained an expiration date. Dorothy Schneider, Purdue Student IDs don't pass
the early voting test, LAFAYETrE Jou A. & COURIER, April 17, 2008. The photo identification
cards did not have an expiration date printed on the face of the cards. Id. However, there was
a possibility that the cards had an expiration date encoded in the magnetic strip. Id. Ulti-
mately, a method was created that allowed the Purdue student identification to be used to
satisfy the photo identification requirement. Purdue University, Early, Election Day voting to be
offered on Purdue Campus, Oct. 20, 2008, available at http://news.uns.purdue.edu/x/2008b/
081020MalavendaElection.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2009).
In addition, prior to the May 2008 primary, a question also arose as to whether
photo identifications issued by the military contained an expiration date. Memorandum from
Co-Counsels, supra note 89, at 4.The military identifications contained a box labeled "Expi-
ration Date." Id. at 4. However, no specific calendar date was present in the expiration date
box. Id. Instead, the letters "INDEF", an abbreviation for indefinite, were used. Id. In a
memo issued a week before the May 6, 2008, primary election, the Indiana Election Divi-
sion found that this expiration date satisfied the requirements of Indiana's photo
identification law. Id.
At the May 2006 primary election, a question arose related to the expiration date
on photo identification offered by Congresswoman Julia Carson. Amy Goldstein,
Democrats Predict Voter ID Problems, WASH. POST, Nov. 3, 2006, available at http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/11 /02/AR2006110201897
pf.html (last visited Nov. 30, 2009). Rep. Carson showed her congressional identification
card for the 109th Congress to a poll worker. Id. The poll worker initially determined that
the congressional identification card did not contain an expiration date because it did not
explicitly contain a calendar date that designated its expiration. Id. Eventually, though, the
poll worker made a phone call to the local election office and a determination was made
that the fact that the card was only designated for the 109th Congress served to satisfy the
requirement of an expiration date. Id.
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Other than voters named "Robert John Crew,"9' poll workers have little
96
to go on.
In the final analysis, then, there may also be some possibility of unconscious bias
when poll workers make decisions as to whether or not a photo identification contains an
expiration date.
95. There are likely not very many prospective voters with this name. A google
search for "Robert John Crew" turned up 1,880 hits, the vast majority of which were
related to Indiana's photo identification law.
96. Another difficulty with names arises when an individual has changed his or her
name so that the photo identification does not match the name in the poll book. The most
common examples of such a name change undoubtedly occur when a person takes a new
last name as a result of marriage or divorce. In this instance, there is a distinct possibility that
the person registered to vote using their previous last name and the name on their photo
identification matches their current last name. For example, assume Brad Pitt marries An-
gelina Jolie. In the poll book, their names are listed as "Brad Pitt" and "Angelina Jolie."
Assume, however, that after the marriage they change their names to "Brad Pitt-Jolie" and
"Angelina Pitt-Jolie" and their Indiana driver's licenses reflect the changes. Memorandum
from Co-Counsels, supra note 89, at 2 (providing example of this hypothetical situation).
This situation creates a thorny question as to whether the name on the photo identifica-
tion "conforms" to the name in the poll book.
According to the Indiana Election Division, when the prospective voter's name in
the poll book does not match the name on the photo identification because of a name
change, the name does "conform" for purposes of photo identification. Id. at 2-3. The rea-
soning here is that the Indiana Election Code allows for a prospective voter to indicate a
name change by writing the necessary information concerning the name change on the
poll book prior to receiving the ballot. IND. CODE § 3-7-41-2 (2006). The prospective
voter may then vote "if otherwise qualified." Id. According to the Indiana Election Divi-
sion:
Under these circumstances, the voter has been permitted to legally vote un-
der the newly changed name and, therefore, must be considered to be
registered under the newly changed name as well. There is nothing further
the voter needs to do after signing the poll book to change her voter regis-
tration ... and, therefore, once she has signed the poll book, her Photo ID
would conform to the name on the poll book.
Memorandum from Co-Counsels, supra note 89, at 3. Of course, this raises a bit of an oddity
in the photo identification law as a voter can, essentially, make a photo identification con-
form to the name in the poll book. The Indiana Election Division recognizes the difficulty
this interpretation poses in other respects as well:
We are mindful that this presents a challenge for the precinct election board
who may feel uncomfortable with the voter signing the poll book before the
determination is made that the Photo ID meets the requirements of the
Photo ID law. However, to interpret the Photo ID law any other way would
appear to contradict IC 3-7-41-2.
Nevertheless, the Indiana Election Division asserts that this interpretation of the Election
Code adheres to the general rule that "election laws be construed liberally in favor of the
electors." Id. (quoting Brown v. State ex rel. Slack, 84 N.E.2d 883 (Ind. 1949)). For purposes
of our thesis here, the level of ambiguity in applying this "rule" creates the possibility for
unconscious bias to play a role on election day.
[VOL. 15:1
If the prospective voter does not have photo identification, declines
to provide photo identification, or if a single member of the precinct
election board determines that the photo identification presented by the
prospective voter does not meet the law's requirements (e.g., the name
does not "conform"), a member of the precinct election board must chal-
lenge the prospective voter.97 The prospective voter then may execute a
challenged voter's affidavit.98 If the prospective voter executes this affidavit
then he or she may cast a provisional ballot.9" In order for that provisional
ballot to count, however, the prospective voter must appear personally in
the circuit clerk's or county election board office within ten days follow-
ing the election. '00 At that appearance, the prospective voter must provide
valid photo identification and execute an affidavit under the penalty of
perjury that he or she is the same person who appeared at the precinct on
election day and cast the provisional ballot.10 ' In the alternative, the pro-
spective voter may execute an affidavit on penalty of perjury that he or
she does not have to show a photo identification because of indigency
(and the inability to obtain proof of identification without payment of a
fee) or a religious objection to being photographed. 0 2
97. IND. CODE 5 3-11-8-25.1(b) (2006). According to the plain language of the
statute, the voter shall be challenged even if only a single member of the precinct election
board makes the determination that the proof of identification is not valid. Id. (providing
that a voter shall be challenged if "a member of the precinct election board determines that
the proof of identification provided by the voter does not qualify as proof of identifica-
tion" (emphasis added)). Put differently, if there is a question as to the validity of a
prospective voter's identification, it does not appear that the issue is put to a vote of the
three-member precinct election board.
98. IND. CODE 5 3-11-8-23(f) (2006). The challenged voter affidavit must be sworn
and affirmed by the prospective voter and must contain: (1) a statement the prospective voter
is a citizen of the United States; (2) the prospective voter's date of birth to the best of the
voter's information or belief, (3) a statement that the prospective voter is a resident of the
precinct or otherwise qualified to cast a ballot in that precinct; (4) the prospective voter's
name and a statement that the prospective voter is generally known by that name; (5) a
statement that the prospective voter has not voted and will not vote in any other precinct in
this election; (6) the prospective voter's occupation; (7) the prospective voter's current resi-
dential address; (8) the prospective voter's understanding that making a false statement on the
affidavit is punishable as perjury; and (9) if the prospective voter's name does not appear on
the poll list, a statement that the prospective voter registered to vote and information about
where and when the individual registered to vote. IND. CODE 5 3-11-8-23 (2006).
99. IND. CODE § 3-11-8-25.1(d) (2006).
100. IND. CODE 5 3-11.7-5-1(b) (2006) (providing for ten-day time period); IND. CODE
3-11.7-5-2.5(a) (2006) (appearance before circuit court clerk or county election board).
101. IND. CODE § 3-11.7-5-2.5(b) (2006).
102. IND. CODE 3-11.7-5- 2.5(c) (2006). At this point, it is important to note a few
other aspects of photo identification in Indiana. First, a prospective voter whose precinct
polling place is located at a state licensed care facility where he or she resides is not re-
quired to provide a government-issued photo identification in order to cast a ballot. IND.
CODE 5 3-11-8-25.1(e) (2006). Second, some persons who cast an absentee ballot do not
need to provide photo identification. IND. CODE 5 3-11-10-1.2 (2006).
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The provisional balloting process, then, provides a theoretical fail-
safe for persons who are denied the ability to cast a regular ballot due to a
lack of valid photo identification. However, as previously mentioned,
10 3
provisional balloting is not fool-proof. Indeed, a recent study showed that
only about 20 percent of persons who voted a provisional ballot because
they lacked photo identification ultimately had their vote counted.
10 4
Moreover, even among those voters who ultimately had their vote
counted, some of them may have been wrongfully burdened into having
to take the extra step to validate their provisional ballot.
In sum, there are two major points to be gleaned from this discus-
sion of photo identification in particular and the operation of Indiana's
polling places more generally that will be important for our discussion of
unconscious bias going forward. First, when it comes to photo identifica-
tion, the law leaves some discretion in the hands of poll workers as to
whether a name on an identification "conforms" to the name on a poll
book. This becomes important for the discussion of unconscious bias be-
cause discretion allows room for poll workers' unconscious bias to
operate. Second, even apart from explicit, de jure discretion, at several
other points during the Indiana voting process-the search for the voter's
name, the decision to challenge based on citizenship, the quality of assis-
tance provided to a prospective voter who needs help, etc.-poll workers
have defacto discretion as to whether the prospective voter casts a count-
able ballot. And unconscious bias may operate in the areas where poll
workers have defacto as well as dejure discretion.
Before moving on, however, it is necessary to emphasize that
whereas Jim Crow laws were explicitly intended to deprive African
Americans of the right to vote based on their race, no credible commen-
tator claims that photo identification laws or the vast majority of other
laws governing the operation of polling places, are intended to be applied
by poll workers in a discriminatory fashion. Rather, photo identification
laws and other election laws are almost always intended to be applied
equally, regardless of the potential voter's race.100 Even, however, if one
assumes little intentional discrimination will occur, there may still be a
problem with unconscious discrimination: a poll worker makes a decision
to allow or disallow a vote (or even simply to inconvenience a prospective
103. See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
104. Pitts, supra note 66, at 497-98.
105. The point is subtle. Credible commentators have claimed that photo identifica-
tion laws are intended to disfranchise minorities, but it is not through discriminatory
application by poll workers. Rather, the intent is inferred based on legislators enacting these
laws knowing that fewer minority voters will have access to photo identification. Supra
note 19 and accompanying text. It is true, though, that some commentators have recog-
nized that notwithstanding legislators' intent, these laws may still be applied in a
discriminatory manner. See Ansolabehere, supra note 24, at 615 (recognizing that "new
[voter identification] rules may amount to a test that is applied capriciously and discrimi-
natorily at polling places, as were literacy tests and other standards").
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voter by requiring him or her to jump through the hoops of provisional
balloting) that, but for the potential voter's race, would have been decided
differently.0 How that might happen, in Indiana as well as elsewhere, is a
subject to which we now turn.
II. UNCONSCIOUS BIAS
There is an enormous amount of evidence demonstrating that the
unconscious can affect us in numerous ways.' °7 And unconscious bias may
be particularly important in the context of exercising the right to vote.
The right to vote, although not explicitly granted by the United States
Constitution,0 8 is nonetheless fundamental because it is "preservative of
all rights."09 Poll workers are democracy's representatives on the front
lines, determining who may cast a countable ballot (or who may have to
jump through additional hoops to have their provisional ballot counted).
In this Part, we explore how unintentional racial discrimination may oc-
cur,"0 beginning with a short introduction to contemporary racism and
106. We are here describing race as the but-for cause of the decision; i.e., but-for the
prospective voter's race, would the decision have been different? In other contexts there
has been controversy regarding whether but-for causation is necessary to sustain a chal-
lenge against the decision, or whether simply finding that race was a factor in the decision
is sufficient. See, e.g., Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,
270 n. 21 (1977) (but-for causation necessary); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228,
250 (1989) (plurality opinion) (same); State v. Lucas, 18 P.3d 160, 163 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001)
(listing cases that have concluded that if race is a factor in the decision the decision is
tainted). We are not taking a position here, but the concerns we express in this Article
apply afortiori to the degree that the factor approach is accepted.
107. Unconscious bias based on race and ethnicity is particularly important, given the
constitutional restrictions on decisions based on these factors. Numerous law review arti-
cles and some judges have used insights regarding unconscious bias to draw legal
conclusions. See articles cited, supra note 14; Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 268-69
(2005) (Breyer, J., concurring); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 344 (2003) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200, 272-274, (1995) (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting); Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 68 (1990) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). In
one Supreme Court case, four members of the court suggested that the majority's decision
resulted from the Justices' unconscious preferences. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 US.
275, 317 (2001) (StevensJ., dissenting).
108. See generally Jamin B. Raskin, Is There a Constitutional Right to Vote and be Repre-
sented?, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 589 (1999);YickWo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356,370 (1886).
109. See, e.g., Harper v.Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667 (1966) (quoting
Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 370) (stating that voting is a "fundamental political right ... preserva-
tive of all rights."). See also Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 627
(1969).
110. We also recognize that partisanship, whether conscious or unconscious, may also
impact decision-making. See, e.g., Drew Westen et al., Neural Bases of Motivated Reasoning:
AnjMRI Study of Emotional Constraints on Partisan Political Judgment in the 2004 U.S. Presi-
dential Election, 18 J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 1947 (2006) (using functional magnetic
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its differences from traditional forms. We then describe the unconscious,
our dual mental processes, and social psychological experiments that
demonstrate the impact our unconscious can have on our behaviors and
decisions-experiments that suggest that even those persons who believe
that they are race-blind may in fact be wrong. Finally, this Part considers
factors that serve either to exacerbate or mitigate unconscious bias and
analyzes these factors in the context of the interaction between poll
workers and prospective voters.
A. Poll Workers Are People Too:A Brief Primer on
How Unconscious Bias Operates
Racism. Racism has drastically changed in the United States-
moving from a regime where explicit prejudice was the order of the day
to one where publicly expressing racist views can make one a social pa-
riah."' Traditionally, discrimination resulted from explicit prejudice. Many
people knew their distaste for members of other racial groups, dismissed
any countervailing norm of equality, and made decisions accordingly."'
Archie Bunker was a representative face in popular culture of this tradi-
tional view."3 Sixty years ago, White Americans tended to believe in the
intellectual inferiority of African Americans. 1 14 More recently, only a small
fraction make this claim."' In 1945, 55 percent of White respondents as-
serted that Whites, as opposed to "Negroes," should be given initial job
opportunities; by 1972, only 3 percent agreed. 116 In the political sphere,
Americans similarly report more enlightened views with respect to sup-
porting individual political candidates. In 1958, a majority of Americans
resonance imaging to demonstrate that Democrats and Republicans respond differently to
information depending on whether it supports their preferred party).
111. See generally Patricia G. Devine & Andrew J. Elliot, Are Racial Stereotypes Really
Fading? The Princeton Trilogy Revisited, 21 PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1139 (1995).
112. Although discrimination and to a greater degree prejudice carry negative con-
notations, racism carries with it even more of a negative connotation. See Lincoln Quillian,
New Approaches to Understanding Racial Prejudice and Discrimination, 32 ANN. REV. Soc. 299,
301 (2006).
113. See generally All in the Family (CBS Television 1971-79). Bunker was named num-
ber one in a ranking of greatest television characters. See Preston Turegano, Bravo is booed for
fumbling '100 Greatest TV Characters', SAN DIEGO TRIB., Dec. 17, 2004, available at http://
www.signonsandiego.com/uniontrib/20041227/newsmzlc27bravo.html (last visited Nov.
30,2009).
114. DONALD R. KINDER & LYNN M. SANDERS, DIVIDED By COLOR: RACIAL POLITICS
AND DEMOCRATIC IDEALS 12-34 (1996).
115. HowARD SCHUMAN ET AL., RACIAL ATTITUDES IN AMERICA: TRENDS AND INTER-
PRETATIONS (1997), web update available at http://www.igpa.uillinois.edu/programs/
racial-attitudes/brief (last visited Nov. 30, 2009) (stating that since 1997 "fewer and fewer
white Americans readily endorse statements that blacks are less intelligent and hardwork-
ing than whites").
116. Quillian, supra note 112, at 309-10 (reporting the results of two surveys).
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indicated they would not cast a ballot for an African American presiden-
tial candidate,"17 but by 2007 that number had dropped to 7 %,I8 (and in
2008 Americans for the first time elected an African American presi-
dent),' 9 Arguably, our society has accepted that it is wrong to judge
people by their race rather than by their character. 1 Race is not an ac-
ceptable criterion: we must be colorblind. Not only is discrimination
morally wrong, in many circumstances it has also become illegal. 1
2 1
Although the concept of colorblindness has become firmly ingrained
in society and overt racism has declined, 22 some studies demonstrate that
discrimination remains a significant problem. 123 Minorities still report that
117. See E.M. Schreiber, Education and Change in American Opinions on a Woman for
President, 42 PUB. OPINION Q. 171,179 (1978).
118. Id. By mid-2008, polls found that 70% of White Americans and 65% of African
Americans believed that the United States was "ready to elect an African American presi-
dent." See, e.g., Adam Nagourney & Meghan Thee, Poll Finds Obama Isn't Closing Divide on
Race, N.Y TIMES, Jul. 16, 2008, at Al (reporting the results of a New York Times/CBS
News public opinion poll).
119. The election of an African American president does not mean that racial differ-
ences or racism has disappeared. Although President Obama received 53% of the popular
vote, his support among African Americans, Latinos and Asians was polled at 95%, 67%, and
62%, respectively, whereas his support among Whites was only 43%. CNN Exit Polls, available
at http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2008/results/polls/#USPOOp (last visited Feb. 15,
2009). Previous polls had also demonstrated significant differences in perception among racial
groups. In July 2008, among other significant differences in perception, whereas more than
80 percent of African Americans had a favorable view of then-Senator Obama, about 30
percent ofWhites had a favorable view. Nagourney & Thee, supra note 118.
120. Schuman et al., supra note 115 (finding that nearly all Americans report favoring
equal treatment independent of race); Quillian, supra note 112, at 299 (finding that most
Americans disfavor overt racism while still maintaining unconscious biases). People do still
make judgments about character, but it is much less likely to be based on race itself and
more likely to be based on race-neutral factors, such as attributing African Americans'
failures to culture or moral shortcomings. See, e.g., David 0. Sears & P.J. Henry, Over Thirty
Years Later, A Look At Symbolic Racism, in 37 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 95,
102 (2005) (arguing that "race-neutral conservative rhetoric often disguises underlying
racial animosity").
121. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified as
amended in pertinent part at 42 U.S.C. 55 2000e-2 to 2000e-17 (2009)); Voting Rights
Act, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 5 2, 79 Stat. 437, 437 (1965) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1973b (2009)).
122. See, e.g., Lawrence D. Bobo, Racial Attitudes and Relations at the Close of the 21st
Century, in AMERICA BECOMING: RACIAL TRENDs AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES, 264, 269-73
(Neil J. Spelser et al. eds., 2001) (summarizing studies showing a change in "fundamental
norms" with respect to race);John F Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner, On the Nature of Con-
temporary Prejudice: The Causes, Consequences and Challenges of Aversive Racism, in
CONFRONTING RACISM: THE PROBLEM AND THE RESPONSE 3 (J. Eberhart & Susan T. Fiske
eds., 1998).
123. IAN AYREs, PERVASIVE PREJUDICE? UNCONVENTIONAL EVIDENCE OF RACE AND
GENDER DISCRIMINATION, 165-314 (2001) (describing unequal access to kidney transplan-
tations and bail bonds); Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg
More Employable than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination,
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they face racial discrimination.1 2 ' American culture and society continue
to project pervasive race-based inequality. African Americans remain the
subjects of such stereotypes as low intelligence, low socio-economic
status, laziness, loudness, and hostility.2 5 Yet even if we consciously reject
the use of these stereotypes (and evidence suggests that we do), 26 these
stereotypes may still affect us.
Unconscious Processes. Social psychological research suggests that the
failure to consistently act upon our ideals may result from unconscious
processes. Specifically, we are aware of society's negative stereotypes,
probably learned them at an early age, 127 and even if we consciously reject
them, we still hold them at an unconscious level. 2 8 Importantly, correla-
tions between measurements of implicit and explicit attitudes are
relatively low, suggesting that people's conscious and unconscious beliefs
can greatly differ. 29 Indeed, the unconscious is no longer your grandpar-
94 AMERICAN ECON. REV. 991 (2004) (employment); Devah Pager, The Mark of a Criminal
Record, 108 AM.J. SOCIOL. 937 (2003);Alexander Green et al., Implicit Bias Among Physicians
and its Prediction of Thrombolysis Decisions for Black and White Patients, 22 J. GENERAL INTER-
NAL MED. 1231 (2007) (medical treatment). See generally Devah Pager & Hana Shepherd,
The Sociology of Discrimination: Racial Discrimination in Employment, Housing, Credit, and Con-
sumer Markets, 34 ANN. Rw. SOCIOL. 181 (2008); Quillian, supra note 112, at 304-09
(providing summaries of studies). Researchers have characterized this less overt form of
prejudice under several different terms such as aversive racism, symbolic racism or modern
racism. See John E Dovidio et al., Contemporary Racial Bias: When Good People Do Bad
Things, in THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF GOOD AND EVIL 141, 141 (Arthur G. Miller ed.,
2004) (aversive racism); John B. McConahay, Modern Racism, Ambivalence, and the Modern
Racism Scale, in PREJUDICE, DISCRIMINATION, AND RACISM 91, 91 (John F Dovidio & Sam-
uel L. Gaertner eds., 1986) (modern racism); David 0. Sears et al., Egalitarian Values and
Contemporary Racial Politics, in RACIALIZED POLITICS: THE DEBATE ABOUT RACISM IN AMER-
ICA 75,77 (David 0. Sears et al. eds., 2000) (symbolic racism).
124. See Nagourney & Thee, supra note 118, at Al (reporting that nearly 70 percent
of African Americans and more than 50 percent of Latinos believed they had been victims
of racial discrimination).
125. Devine & Elliot, supra note 111, at 1142-44 (1995).
126. Id. at 1145 (arguing that "personal beliefs toward African Americans ... are, at
present, predominately positive").
127. See, e.g., Yarrow Dunham et al., From American City to Japanese Village: A Cross-
Cultural Investigation of Implicit Race Attitudes, 77 CHILD DEV. 1268 (2006) (finding implicit
race bias in six- and ten-year-old children).
128. See, e.g.,John F Dovidio & Samuel A. Gaertner, Aversive Racism, in 36 ADVANCES
IN EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 1,4 (2004).
129. Russell H. Fazio & Michael A. Olson, Implicit Measures in Social Cognition Re-
search: Their Meaning and Use, 64 ArrN. REV. PSYCHOL. 297, 303-04 (2003) (finding
correlations between unconscious prejudice and stereotypes and explicit attitudes were
generally below 0.2). There are other possible explanations for the low correlations be-
tween self-report and implicit measures, including social desirability (i.e., people try to
look less racist than they are). See generally Wilhelm Hoffman et al., What Moderates Explicit-
Implicit Consistency?, 16 Eum. REV. SOCIAL PSYCHOL. 335 (2005) (reviewing factors that may
explain low correlations between self-report and implicit measures).
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ents' Freudian unconscious.' 30 The new unconscious is less obsessed with
sex and presumptively adaptive. It is now seen as more like a Darwinian
unconscious, something necessary to help us survive. 3' In particular, the
unconscious affects our decision-making in ways of which we are fre-
quently unaware. To understand this, we must recognize how we have
two decision-making processes rather than one.
People have both a reflective system and a reflexive system.13  The
two systems in many situations use different neural structures.13 The re-
flective system is conscious, purposeful and time-consuming. It can, for
the most part, be controlled deliberately.13' This is the system we are usu-
ally referring to with the term "thinking.' ' 36 The reflexive system, by
130. See generally John A. Bargh, Bypassing The Will: Toward Demystifying The Noncon-
scions Control of Social Behavior, in THE NEW UNCONSCIous 37 (Ran R. Hassin et al. eds.,
2005).
131. See generally TIMOTHY D. WILSON, STRANGERS TO OURSELVES (2002) (discussing
the "adaptive" unconscious).
132. Perhaps the paradigmatic example of this is the evidence that suggests we actu-
ally make a decision unconsciously up to ten seconds before we are consciously aware that
we made a decision. See Chun Siong Soon et al., Unconscious Determinants Of Free Decisions
In The Human Brain, 11 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 543, 543 (2008) (recording neural signals
that indicated a decision had been reached before the participant was aware of the deci-
sion). See also Benjamin Libet, Do We Have Free Will?, in THEVOLITIONAL BRAIN: TowARDS A
NEUROSCIENCE OF FREE WILL 47 (Benjamin Libet, et al. eds., 2000) (finding that choices
were initiated up to one third of a second before participants were aware of them). For
other unusual examples of the unconscious affecting people see John A. Bargh et al.,
Automaticity of Social Behavior: Direct Effects of Trait Construct and Stereotype Activation on Ac-
tion, 71 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 230 (1996) (finding that 63% of participants
interrupted a conversation when unconsciously primed with words related to rudeness,
but only 17% interrupted when primed with words related to politeness); Ap J. Dijkster-
huis et al., Seeing One Thing and Doing Another: Contrast Effects in Automatic Behavior, 75 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 862,866-67 (1998) (finding that participants walking speed
was affected after experimenters primed them with "elderly");Jonah Berger et al., Contex-
tual Priming: Where People Vote Affects How They Vote, 105 PNAS 8846 (2008) (arguing that
whether a polling station is a church or a school affects how people vote).Jonathan Haidt
concludes, "[t]he emerging view in social cognition is that most of our behaviors and
judgments are in fact made automatically." Jonathan Haidt, The Emotional Dog and its Ra-
tional Tai: A Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment, 108 PSYCHOL. REV. 814, 819
(emphasis in original).
133. See generally DUAL-PROCESS THEORIES IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (Shelly Chaiken &
YaacovTrope eds., 1999).
134. Ajay B. Satpute & Matthew D. Lieberman, Integrating Automatic and Controlled
Processes Into Neurocognitive Models of Social Cognition, 1079 BRAIN RESEARCH 86 (2006).
135. As anyone who has attempted not to think about something can attest, it is not
completely controllable. See e.g. Daniel M. Wegner, Ironic Processes of Mental Control, 101
PSYCHOL. REV. 34, 34-35 (1994).
136. Somewhat counterintuitively, the reflective system is not necessarily best at deci-
sion-making, and is sometimes worse. See, e.g. ,Ap J. Dijksterhuis et al., On Making the Right
Choice: The Deliberation- Without-Attention Effect, 311 SCIENCE 1005, 1007 (2006) (finding
that participants made better complex decisions when they were unable to focus conscious
attention on the choice, and that this effect increased the more complicated the decision);
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contrast, is unconscious or implicit.3 7 The reflexive system takes little
effort, acts quickly, and is often characterized as automatic. For example,
the reflexive system is what puts our bodies into fight or flight mode
when we are startled by something. It is also the system that allows us to
suddenly hear our names across a crowded room,'38 or allows us to have
the "eureka" moment.'3 Put simply, part of our brain makes conscious
choices, and another part of our brain makes unconscious choices.
Associations Affect Thinking. Of particular importance for unconscious
bias, the reflexive system operates using associations, or links, between co-
varying concepts. If you think of one attribute, linked attributes become
more accessible, meaning they come more readily to mind. For example,
if we asked you to think of a tall building, you would be more likely to
name the Eiffel Tower if you had been thinking of Paris or France (and
more likely to name the Empire State Building if you had been thinking
about New York, or the Sears Tower if you had been thinking about Chi-
cago).
Importantly, though, one need not consciously think about an at-
tribute. In the somewhat awkward phrasing of psychology, an attribute
can be activated (or primed) without any conscious awareness, and this
activation can then influence a person's perception, judgment, and behav-
ior. For example, if we showed you the word "Paris" on a computer
screen for 200 milliseconds-enough time for your brain to register the
image but not enough time for you to be aware of what you read-Paris
would be activated, and all of the co-varying attributes, like baguettes,
French, the month of April, and the Eiffel Tower (or Hilton, for those un-
der the age of 30) would all become more accessible.4 Attributes less
Timothy D.Wilson & Jonathan W Schooler, Thinking Too Much: Introspection Can Reduce the
Quality of Preferences and Decisions, 60 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 181 (1991) (show-
ing that increased conscious deliberation can result in less accurate judgments).
137. Unconscious and implicit are often used synonymously There is, in fact, signifi-
cant ambiguity in how psychologists use the terms. See, e.g., Jan De Hower & Agnes de
Moors, How to Define and Examine the Implicitness of Implicit Measures, in IMPLICIT MEASURES
OF ATTITUDES, 179 (Berndt Wittenbrink & Norbert Schwarz, eds., 2007). For our purposes
the distinctions are unimportant to our larger claim that poll workers' unconscious biases
are likely to affect the administration of election laws without the poll workers' conscious
awareness. See Bertram Gawronski & Galen V. Bodenhausen, "hat Do We Know About
Implicit Attitude Measures and "hat Do We Have to Learn?, in IMPLICIT MEASURES OF ATTI-
TUDES, supra note 137, at 272.
138. The experience of suddenly hearing a personally-relevant word has been
termed the cocktail party effect. See generally Barry Arons, A Review of the Cocktail Party
Effect,J. AM.VOICE INPUT/OUTPuT Soc'Y, July 1992, at 35, available at http://xenia.media.
mit.edu/-barons/cocktail.html (accessed Nov. 27, 2009).
139. See generally DAVID PERKINS, THE EUREKA EFFECT: THE ART AND LOGIC OF BREAK-
THROUGH THINKING (2001).
140. There are other methods of priming. Pictures or faces rather than words could
also be shown long enough to be read or recognized by the unconscious but not long
enough to be consciously identifiable. Or subjects can be shown a group of words which
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associated with Paris, such as fish and chips, Swahili, and the Great Pyra-
mids, would become relatively less accessible. When an attribute is more
accessible, it takes less cognitive effort to think of that attribute; conversely,
when an attribute is less accessible, it takes more cognitive effort to think
of that attribute. 141
Measurement. Measuring these automatic (or implicit) associations
is difficult, particularly for those associations that are consciously re-
jected, such as some associations connected with race. 142 The most
common assessment procedure measures response latency, based on the
notion that people will perform more slowly if the association between
object and attribute is unfamiliar. 43 The much written about (and fre-
quently criticized) Implicit Association Test (IAT) is one example of this
type of assessment procedure. 4 The test, now available in fourteen dif-
ferent areas,'4 ' requires participants to respond to paired concepts. Sure
enough, people respond more quickly to concepts that are closely related
include somewhat more words linked to the attributes the experimenters wish to activate,
such as shuffleboard, basketball, Florida, retired, and voting to activate elderly. Even the
presence of an experimenter of a particular race may be enough to activate that construct.
See, e.g., Brian S. Lowery et al., Social Influence Effects on Automatic Racial Prejudice, 81 J. PER-
SONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 842, 851 (2001). Similarly, it can merely be a matter of making
a particular identity more salient. For example, an Asian woman using chopsticks is more
likely to activate Asian stereotypes whereas an Asian woman applying make-up is more
like to activate female stereotypes. C. Neil Macrae et al., Thle Dissection of Selection in Person
Perception: Inhibitory Processes in Social Stereotyping, 69 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 397,
402-03 (1995).
141. For a general review of implicit attitudes, see Fazio & Olson, supra note 129.
142. Measuring attitudes with implicit measures has the benefit of addressing both
those who might conceal unpopular or unacceptable views and those who are not con-
sciously aware of the attitude. For a general discussion, see Fazio & Olson, supra note 129,
at 318-20.
143. Other assessment procedures include indirect self reports, memory tasks (people
may remember closely associated objects and attributes more easily), and physiological
responses (such as eye blinks, or the movement of facial muscles (facial electromyography)).
For a detailed discussion of different measurement methods, see chapters 2 to 6 in IMPLICIT
MEASURE OF ATTITUDES, supra note 137. Specific tests include the affect misattribution
procedure, Extrinsic Affective Simon Task, Go/No-Go Association Task, and approach
avoidance tasks. See generally Bertram Gawronski, Ten Frequently Asked Questions About
Implicit Measures and Their Frequently Supposed, But Not Entirely Correct Answers, 50 CANA-
DIAN PSYCHOL. 141-57 (2009).
144. Anthony Greenwald et al., Measuring Individual Differences in Implicit Cognition:
The Implicit Association Test, 74 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 1464, 1464 (1998). In some
ways the IAT is analogous to the seventy-year-old Stroop test. Stroop observed that it was
harder to state the color of ink if the ink spells out the name of a different color. For
example, identifying purple ink used to write the word yellow was difficult. Overriding
the brain's attempt to read the word, rather than recognize the color, takes longer.
145. Project Implicit, https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/demo/ (last visited Nov.
30, 2009) (providing tests regarding race, skin-tone, Arab-Muslim, Asian American, Native
American, gender (career and science), sexuality, weight, disability, religion, weapons, can-
didates and presidents).
Michigan Journal of Race & Law
(flower, pleasant; insect, unpleasant) than those that are not closely related
(flower, unpleasant; insect, pleasant). "6 Although there is some evidence
that IAT responses can be consciously controlled, it takes some effort on
the part of a person to control IAT responses. 117 The IAT and other
methods of assessing implicit attitudes become more interesting--and
more controversial-when applied to attitudes about people.
Stereotypes about people, implicit or otherwise, are arguably just an-
other kind of association.4 They can be thought of as simply a type of
adaptive categorization, in that we must make some assessments based on
group membership or we would be overwhelmed by detail. Nearly every-
one has knowledge of the content of racial and ethnic stereotypes (e.g.,
White men can't jump), even if they do not consciously accept them.
149
Stereotypes are activated by a person's salient (or most noticeable) features,
typically one or more of the "top three" visible factors: race, sex, and age.150
Interpretation. Americans are generally able to associate positive
words more quickly with Whites than they are able to associate positive
words with African Americans."' Psychologists generally interpret this to
mean that people tend to have automatic preferences for (or implicit
146. Laurie A. Rudman & Richard D. Ashmore, Discrimination and the Implicit Association
Test, 10 GROUP PROCESSES & INTERGROUP RELATIONS 359, 359-60 (2007) (using dog/loyal
and cat/aloof as examples).
147. See, e.g., Karl Christoph Klauer & Sarah Teige-Mocigemba, Controllability and
Resource Dependence in Automatic Evaluation, 43 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 648 (2007).
148. Implicit stereotypes are typically defined as "the introspectively unidentified (or
inaccurately identified) traces of past experience that mediate attributions of qualities to
members of a social category." Anthony G. Greenwald & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Implicit Social
Cognition:Attitudes, Self-Esteem, and Stereotypes, 102 PSYCHOL. REV. 4, 15 (1995).
149. Devine & Elliot, supra note 111, at 1139. There can be several sources of a
stereotype's content. Culture is very important, as we are incessantly bombarded with
stereotypical images.
150. Susan T Fiske, Stereotyping, Prejudice and Discrimination, in 2 HANDBOOK OF So-
ciAL PSYCHOLOGY 357,375 (Susan T. Fiske et al., eds., 4th ed. 1998).
151. See, e.g., Nilanja Dagupta et al., Automatic Preference for White Americans: Eliminat-
ing the Familiarity Explanation, 33 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 316 (2000); Russell H.
Fazio et al., Variability in Automatic Activation as an Unobtrusive Measure of Racial Attitudes:A
Bona Fide Pipeline?, 69 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1013 (1995); Anthony Greenwald
et al., Measuring Individual Differences in Implicit Cognition: The Implicit Association Test, 74 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1464, 1478 (1998); Samuel L. Gaertner & J.P McLaughlin,
Racial Stereotypes: Associations And Ascriptions Of Positive And Negative Characteristics, 46 Soc.
PSYcHOL. Q. 23 (1983) (demonstrating that Whites were more quickly associated with
positive traits than African Americans). The reverse is true for negative words: people are
generally able to associate negative words more quickly with African Americans than they
are able to associate negative words with Whites. See id.
These results are sensitive to culture. For example researchers have shown that Japa-
nese participants have implicit negative associations regarding Koreans, and Korean
participants have similar negative associations regarding Japanese. See, e.g. Greenwald et al.,
supra; Kristin A. Lane et al., Implicit Social Cognition and Law, 3 ANN. Riv. L. Soc. Sci. 427
(2007) (lighter skin is associated with positives and darker skin is associated with negatives).
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biases in favor of) Whites over African Americans. 1 2 Other assessment




Perhaps seventy percent of Whites have implicit negative stereotypes to-
ward African Americans. s4 Moreover, Whites may also hold negative
implicit stereotypes about other racial groups, including Asians ' and La-
tinos.116 Members of minority racial groups are not immune from these
biases, frequently holding negative stereotypes about their own groups.57
152. Lincoln Quillian, Does Unconscious Racism Exist?, 71 Soc. PSYCHOL. Q. 6, 8
(2008) (arguing that "[t]he majority view in psychology is that these experiments show
that the large majority of white and some nonwhites hold negative implicit associations
toward minority groups"); see also Lane et al., supra note 151, at 427.The Implicit Associa-
tion Test and unconscious racism in general have also been criticized. See, e.g., Philip E.
Tetlock & Gregory Mitchell, Calibrating Prejudice in Milliseconds, 71 Soc. PSYCHOL. Q. 12,
12 (2007) (claiming that "proponents have yet to provide compelling evidence for their
assertions about the pervasiveness of unconscious bias and its behavioral consequences");
Gregory Mitchell & Philip E. Tetlock, Antidiscrimination and the Perils of Mindreading, 67
OHIO STATE L.J. 1023 (2006); Frederica Conrey et al., Separating Multiple Process in Implicit
Social Cognition: The Quad Model of Implicit Task Peformance, 89 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSY-
CHOL. 469 (2005). See generally Klaus Fiedler et al., Unresolved Problems With the T, the 'A',
and the 'T': A Logical and Psychometric Critique of the Implicit Association Test (IAT), 17 EuR.
Pv. Soc. PsYcHoL. 74 (2006). One important potential problem is that test-retest reliabil-
ity is relatively low (median r = .57). Brian Nosek et al., The Implicit Association Test at Age
7: A Methodological and Conceptual Review, AUTOMATIC PROCESSES IN SOCIAL THINKING AND
BEHAVIOR 265 (2007).
153. John E Dovidio et al., On the Nature of Prejudice: Automatic and Controlled Proc-
esses, 33 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 510, 522-23 (1997) (showing that Whites are able
to recognize positive words more quickly when primed with White faces than when
primed with African American faces); Fazio et al., supra note 151, at 1019 (finding that
Whites showed higher levels of negativity when primed with African American faces than
when primed with White faces, and that these attitudes were correlated with the quality of
interaction with the African American experimenter); Bernd Wittenbrink et al., Evidence
for Racial Prejudice at the Implicit Level and its Relationship With Questionnaire Measures, 72 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 262, 273 (1997) (finding the presence of implicit prejudice
by using explicit questionnaires).
154. Nilanjana Dasgupta, Implicit Ingroup Favoritism, Outgroup Favoritism, and Their
Behavioral Manifestations, 17 Soc. JUSTICE R.SEaAiCH 143, 147 (2004) (finding "White
Americans, on average, show strong implicit preference for their own group and relative
bias against African Americans"); Dovidio & Gaertner, supra note 128, at 20 (concluding
that "the vast majority of [W]hite Americans harbor unconscious negative associations
about blacks"); Brian A. Nosek et al., Pervasiveness and Correlates of Implicit Attitudes and
Stereotypes, 18 EuR. REV. Soc. PSYCHOL. 36 (2007) (stating that close to 70% ofWhites held
implicit biases against African Americans).
155. L. Son Hing et al., Inducing Hypocrisy to Reduce Prejudicial Responses Among Aver-
sive Racists, 38 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 71 (2002).
156. Eric Uhlman et al., Subgroup Prejudice Based on Skin Color Among Hispanics in the
United States and Latin America, 20 Soc. COGNITION 198, 198-99 (2002) (finding implicit
preferences for lighter skinned subgroups). There is also some evidence of negative implicit
attitudes held by people in other countries. Bertram Gawronski et al., Implicit Bias in
Impression Formation:Associations Influence the Construal of Individuating Information, 33 EUR.J.
Soc. PSYCHOL. 573,582 (2003).
157. Nilanjana Dasgupta, supra note 154, at 149.
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Impact. It is not, however, enough to demonstrate that people may
hold implicit race-based stereotypes. We must also show that implicit
stereotypes affect people's judgment and behavior in non-trivial ways.15 8
The critical (and somewhat disconcerting) fact is that implicit attitudes,
159 - 60
even if consciously rejected, affect people's judgment and behavior.
Implicit racial biases have been linked to many different behaviors,'6'
and in some cases may be a better predictor of behavior than explicit self-
reports. '62 For example, one study showed that participants' explicit bias
was a predictor of the content of what Whites said to African Americans
but that implicit bias was a predictor of the manner (e.g., nonverbal cues)
in which something was said.16 1 In other words, people who profess to be
unbiased might not say unkind words to African Americans, but they
might say neutral words in a manner that is perceived as unkind. Other
158. As early as 1935 a researcher demonstrated that automatic processes could
interfere with the conscious desired result. J. Ridley Stroop, Studies on the Interference in
Serial Verbal Reactions, 18 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 643, 659 (1935) (finding that the
controlled response, accurately stating the color of a word, was affected by the automatic
process of reading the word itself).
159. For example, when stereotypes are activated, ambiguous inputs are more likely
to be perceived in a way consistent with the stereotypes. See, e.g., Patricia G. Devine,
Stereotypes and Prejudice: The Automatic and Controlled Components, 56 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 5, 5 (1989); Ziva Kunda & Sherman-Williams, Stereotypes and the Construal of
Individuating Information, 19 PERSONALITY & SOCIAL PSYCHOL. BULL. 90 (2003).
160. Reviews of implicit stereotypes' influence appear in John A. Bargh, The Cognitive
Monster: The Case Against the Controllability of Automatic Stereotype Effects, in DuAL-PRoCEss
THEORIES IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 361, 363 (Shelly Chaiken & Yaacov Trope eds., 1999)
and Irene V Blair, Implicit Stereotypes and Prejudice, in COGNITIVE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: THE
PRINCETON SYMPOSIUM ON THE LEGACY AND FUTuRE OF SOCIAL COGNITION 359 (Gordon
Moskowitz, ed., 2001). See also Susan T. Fiske et al., The Continuum Model: Ten Years Later, in
DUAL-PROCEss THEORIES IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 231,234 (Shelly Chaiken &Yaacov Trope
eds., 1999) (noting how people frequently will automatically "feel, think, and behave to-
ward" individual members of a social category in the same way that they do "toward
members of that social category more generally").
161. Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific Foundations, 94
CAL. L. REV. 945, 960-61 (2006) (observing that there is substantial evidence showing that
unconscious bias results in discriminatory behavior);William A. Cunningham et al., Implicit
Attitude Measures: Consistency, Stability and Convergent Validity, 12 PSYCHOL. ScI. 163 (2001)
(demonstrating how implicit intergroup attitudes are correlated with automatic and unin-
tended responses without the participants conscious awareness).
162. Anthony G. Greenwald et al., Understanding and Using the Implicit Association Test:
III. Meta-analysis of Predictive Validity, 97 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 17, 32 (2009)
(performing a meta-analysis of numerous IAT studies and concluding that its results "sig-
nificantly exceeded the predictive validity of self-report measures" for racial and other
intergroup behavior).
163. John E Dovidio et al., Inlplicit and Explicit Prejudice and Interracial Interaction, 82 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 62 (2002). Interestingly, Whites evaluated the interaction
based on content whereas African Americans evaluated the interaction based on the manner.
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studies showed that people responded with greater hostility,16 4 or per-
ceived others as more aggressive, when primed with words or African
American faces, and these reactions did not correspond to consciously
expressed prejudice. 4 When faced with a news report, viewers favored
greater punishment for a dark skinned suspect than a suspect identical in
all respects but with a lighter skin tone.166 Police officers would shoot
more quickly at an African American suspect than a comparable White
suspect. 61 Recruiters called back job applicants with typically White
names 50% more often than applicants with typically African American
names, even though the resumes were identical. 16 Participants were more
likely to remember African American-sounding names as criminals than
White names.169 As "physicians' pro-white implicit bias increased, so did
their likelihood of treating white patients and not treating African Ameri-
can patients with thrombolysis." 7 °  Implicit preference influenced
participants' reports of harmful discriminatory actions toward African
Americans." It also predicted participants' willingness to impose budget
cuts on Jewish, Asian, and African American student groups. 1 2 At a neuro-
logical level, the racial IAT has been linked to increased activation of the
164. John A. Bargh et al., Automaticity of Social Behavior: Direct Effects of Trait Construct
and Stereotype Activation on Action, 71 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 230, 238-39 (1996);
Mark Chen & John A. Bargh, Nonconscious Behavior Confirmation Process; The Self-Fuefilling
Consequences of Automatic Sterotype Activation, 33 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 541, 552
(1997).
165. Devine, supra note 159, at 10-12.
166. Franklin D. Gilliam, Jr. & Shanto Iyengar, Prime Suspects: The Influence of Local
Television News on the Viewing Public, 44 AM.J. POL. Sci. 560, 563-67 (2000).
167. Joshua Correll et al., The Police Officer's Dilemma: Using Ethnicity to Disambiguate
Potentially Threatening Individuals, 83 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1314, 1327-28
(2002).
168. See Bertrand & Mullainathan, supra note 123; Jonathan C. Ziegert & Paul J.
Hanges, Employment Discrimination:The Role of Implicit Attitudes, Motivation, and a Climate for
Racial Bias, 90 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 553 (2005).
169. Mahzarin R. Banaji & R. Bhaskar, Implicit Stereotypes And Memory: The Bounded
Rationality of Social Belief, in MEMORY, BRAIN, AND BELIEF 139, 151 (D. L. Schacter & E.
Scarry, eds., 2000) (finding that "on average subjects 'remembered' 1.7 times as many black
than white names as criminals"); REID HASTIE & ROBYN M. DAWES, RATIONAL CHOICE IN
AN UNCERTAIN WORLD 81 (2000) (citing a 1995 study by Wendi Walsh et al. showing that
participants remembered twice as many African American than White names as criminals).
170. Green et al., supra note 123, at 1231. But cf, J. A. Sabin et al., Physician Implicit
Attitudes and Stereotypes About Race and Quality of Medical Care, 46 MED. CARE 678 (2008)
(finding evidence that although pediatricians held the implicit stereotype that African
American patients were less compliant than White patients, this stereotype did not signifi-
candy affect treatment recommendations).
171. See Rudman & Ashmore, supra note 146, at 370.
172. Id.
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175 . 174
amygdala and neurological processes," 3 lower performance ratings,
avoidance behaviors,7 7 and negative interpersonal interactions.
1 76
Based on the above understanding, discrimination is less likely to re-
sult from invidious motivation, the deliberate actions of a bigot, and more
likely to result from implicit biases stemming from cultural exposure and
normal cognitive processes. We (with some frequency) are unknowingly
affected by the associations we have learned, i.e. stereotypes. Prejudiced
decision-making and behavior are the result.' 77 As Park & Rachlinski re-
cently concluded, unconscious bias against African Americans is a
"widespread and important phenomenon."'7 8 Importantly for purposes of
this Article, poll workers drawn from the population at large will also have
these biases.' 79 They are, however, also somewhat context dependent. Ac-
cordingly, we look now at what factors may aggravate or mitigate their
impact. More specifically, we look at how what happens on election day
in a polling place may serve to aggravate or mitigate the impact of uncon-
scious bias.
173. The amgdala governs the fight or flight response and is one of the oldest parts
of the brain. See Greenwald, supra note 161, at 962. See also William A. Cunningham et al.,
Separable Neural Components in the Processing of Black and Mhite Faces, 15 PSYcHOL. Sci. 806,
811 (2004) (showing Whites respond at a neurological level to African American faces,
even where the African American faces are not consciously perceived); Elizabeth A. Phelps
et al., Performance on Indirect Measures of Race Evaluation Predicts Amygdala Activation, 12 J.
COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 729 (2006).
174. David Amodio & Patricia Devine, Stereotyping And Evaluation In Implicit Race
Bias: Evidence For Independent Constructs And Unique Effects On Behavior, 91 J. PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 652 (2006).
175. Id.
176. Dovidio, supra note 163; Allen McConnell & Jill Leibold, Relations Among the
Implicit Association Test, Discriminatory Behaivor, and Explicit Measures of Racial Attitude, 37 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 435 (2001);Wittenbrink et al., supra note 153 (finding that
participants primed in the African American condition interpreted the behavior of a third
party as more threatening and hostile than those in the White condition).
177. Of course, unconscious bias is only one possible cause. Explicit bias, although no
longer socially acceptable in polite company, may also be a cause. See, e.g., R. Richard
Banks & Richard Thompson Ford, (How) Does Unconscious Bias Matter?: Law, Politics, and
Racial Inequality, (2008) (unpublished article), available at http://works.bepress.com/
context/rbanks/article/1001/type/native/viewcontent/; KATHERINE BLEE, INSIDE OR-
GANIZED RACISM (2002).
178. Park & Rachlinski, supra note 15, at 8.
179. Although poll workers are disproportionately elderly, there is no evidence to
suggest that they are less likely to be affected by unconscious biases than younger people.
Alvarez, et al., supra note 78, at 18 (survey showing that 57% of poll workers were esti-
mated to be more than 51 years old).
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B. Why Polling Places Seem to Be an Optimal Arena for the
Operation of Unconscious Bias
Initially many psychologists thought that unconscious biases oper-
ated automatically and indiscriminately, but more recent studies
demonstrate that context can serve as an important mediator of uncon-
scious biases. Unfortunately, many of the contextual factors that
researchers have shown to reduce the impact of discrimination, uncon-
scious or otherwise, are not applicable in the context of poll workers'
interactions with prospective voters. These factors include the nature of
the decision, the availability of cognitive resources, the presence of indi-
viduating information, and the decision-maker's level of motivation: all
can mitigate implicit biases' impact, but few of these mitigators are neces-
sarily present in an election day polling place.
Unconscious bias appears most likely to make a difference for deci-
sions that might be described as judgment calls rather than decisions
where the outcome is clear, ' as several experiments have shown. For ex-
ample, in the employment context, decision-makers faced with similarly
qualified individuals were likely to choose the White candidate over the
African American candidate, but where one candidate had clearly superior
credentials, that candidate was chosen regardless of whether the candidate
was White or African American."" In the school admission context, deci-
sion-makers admitted applicants who had high GPAs and test scores of
every race before admitting those applicants who were high in one meas-
ure and low in the other. When decision-makers did turn to applicants
who were high in one measure but low in another measure (i.e., the am-
biguous cases), decision-makers preferred White applicants. 8 2
What this suggests in the voting context is that poll workers are
likely to allow clearly qualified voters to cast ballots regardless of their
180. Another way of thinking about this is that unconscious bias is more likely when
a decision-maker is applying a standard rather than a bright-line rule. For the leading
comparison of the relative merits of rules and standards see Louis Kaplow, Rules versus
Standards:An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992).
181. John F Dovidio & Samuel Gaertner, Aversive Racism and SelectionDecisions: 1989
and 1999, 11 PSYCHOL. Sci. 315 (2000).
182. See Gordon Hodson et al., Processes in Racial Discrimination: Differential Weighing of
Conflicting Information, 28 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 460 (2002). When pre-
sented with a White applicant with a high SAT and a low GPA and an African American
applicant with a low SAT and a high GPA, decision-makers preferred the White applicant.
No problem so far, as preference for a high SAT by itself does not show bias. But when
presented with the reverse situation (an African American applicant with a high SAT and a
low GPA and a White applicant with a low SAT and a high GPA), decision-makers also
preferred the White applicant. Id. at 467-70.The problem is not whether one criterion is
a better predictor than the other, but rather that decision-makers tended to privilege the
criterion that resulted in admission of the White applicant. In a sense, African American
applicants who were judgment calls were treated in a "heads I win, tails you lose" manner.
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race or ethnicity. In other words, a poll worker is not likely to deny the
right to cast a ballot to a prospective voter of any race who clearly meets
all the legal requirements and who does not need any special assistance or
encounter any difficulties in casting a ballot. Thus, an African American
voter who walks into an Indiana polling place, whose name is easily found
on the registration list, who shows a valid driver's license with a name that
exactly matches the name on the voter registration list, and who has no
trouble signing the poll book and operating the voting machinery will
not likely be denied the right to vote because of unconscious bias.
' 83
However, when, for example, the name on the photo identification does
not exactly match the name on the voter registration list and the poll
worker must make a judgment as to whether or not the name on the
photo identification conforms to the name on the registration list,'8 4 un-
conscious bias may play a role.
Of course, the distinction between a clear decision and a judgment
call is sometimes ambiguous. For example, Indiana law requires poll
workers to ask every prospective voter for photo identification. On its
face, this is a clear requirement, but de jure requirements are not necessar-
ily followed. It is possible that at a particular polling place the norm could
be for poll workers not to ask for identification, just as some grocery
stores selling liquor may claim that they ask for identification from all
purchasers, but actually do not. Some evidence shows that poll workers
do not follow consistent rules when it comes to the implementation of
photo identification requirements. A nationwide survey of voters from the
2008 general election showed that in states that required all prospective
voters to show photo identification, about 25 percent of voters said they
showed photo identification because it was convenient and not because
photo identification was required.185 If this is the case, the decision to ask
for photo identification becomes, from a functional perspective, a judg-
ment call, and one that might be affected by unconscious bias.
Judgment calls tend to create an opportunity for unconscious bias.
However, it is less likely that a person will use (and act upon) unconscious
stereotypes the more cognitive resources (i.e., brain power) a person has
available. A person trying to make a decision in a hurry may be unable to
use his or her cognitive resources. If people are allowed time to control
their responses, high prejudice people will show more prejudice than low
prejudice people.'86 If, however, people do not have time to control (or, in
183. Of course, a poll worker could consciously be biased and, as a result, turn such a
voter away. However, this seems less likely to happen in today's polling places. See supra
notes 9-11 and accompanying text.
184. See supra notes 88-96 and accompanying text for a discussion of the ambiguities
in the Indiana law.
185. Alvarez et al., supra note 78, at III, 22.
186. Mary E. Wheeler & Susan T. Fiske, Controlling Racial Prejudice: Social Cognitive
Goals Affect Am ygdala and Stereotype Activation, 16 PsYCHOL. Sci. 56 (2005).
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psychological terms, inhibit) their responses, then both high and low
prejudice people are likely to demonstrate bias)8 7 Put differently, people
who aspire not to be prejudiced do better when they have more time to
think. This effect can be seen at a neurological level. A part of the brain,
the limbic system, automatically activates based on a very brief showing of
an African American face.'"8 If the face is shown for a longer time, half a
second, the prefrontal cortex can act to resist the stereotyped fear.'8 9
Timing has implications for polling place decisions. When turnout
of prospective voters is light--say, for a local election of the proverbial
dog-catcher-and poll workers have ample time to deliberate about their
decisions, then unconscious bias will likely play less of a role in the ad-
ministration of an election. However, if lines at the polling place wrap
around the block-a not uncommon event at some of the more high-
profile and competitive elections, such as Presidential contests'9°-poll
workers will feel pressure to make decisions more quickly, and quicker
decisions are more likely to be affected by unconscious bias.' 9'
The amount of information available to the decision-maker also
plays a role in the operation of unconscious bias. The more individuating
information people have regarding the people about whom they are mak-
ing the decision, the less unconscious bias there will be.' 92 Typically, people
will have less individuating information about those in other racial groups
187. John F Dovidio et al, supra note 163 at 66-67 (2002); GalenV. Bodenhausen et
al., Stereotypes in Thought and Deed: Social-cognitive Origins of Intergroup Discrimination, in
INTERGROUP COGNITION AND INTERGROUP BEHAVIOR 311, 319 (Constantine Sedikides et
al., eds, 1998) (observing that mental "busyness" exacerbates the use of stereotypes).
188. Cunningham et al., supra note 173, at 811. See also Wim De Neys et al., Smarter
Than We Think: When Our Brains Detect That We Are Biased, 19 PSYCHOL. Sci. 483 (2008)
(showing the same effect with stereotypes of engineers).
189. Id.
190. Katrina vanden Heuvel, America Needs Electoral Reform, THE NATION, July 21,
2008, http://www.thenation.com/doc/20080721/kvh (discussing long lines during the
2004 presidential election in Ohio and long lines during the 2006 mid-term elections in
Colorado, Georgia, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and
Utah).
191. This also suggests that on election day we should be more concerned about
unconscious bias during peak voting times, which typically occur at the beginning and
end of the workday.
192. Ziva Kunda & Stephen J. Spencer, Mhen Do Stereotypes Come to Mind and When
Do They Color Judgment? A Goal-based Theoretical Framework for Stereotype Activation and Ap-
plication, 129 PSYCHOL. BULL. 522, 528 tbl. 1 (2003) (finding that many studies had shown
the benefits of individuating information); Ziva Kunda & Paul Thargard, Forming Impres-
sions from Stereotypes, Traits and Behaviors: A Parallel-Constraint-Satisfaction Theory, 103
PSYCHOL. REV. 284,300 (1996);Joachim Krueger & Myron Rothbart, Use of Categorical and
Individuating Information in Making Inferences About Personality, 55 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 187, 194 (1988).
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than they have about those in their own group: 193 "[t]hey are all alike and
different from us, besides.' 94 As one would expect, stereotypes operate the
most where one has the least information. One might hold the stereotype
that men in the United States like sports, but one only need to hear a
male co-worker say that he does not like sports to realize that the stereo-
type does not apply to that particular male.
When it comes to polling places, poll workers have very little indi-
viduating information available to them about prospective voters."5 Poll
workers are able to see the prospective voter's appearance and demeanor.
The poll books contain the voter's name, address, signature, and little
else. 19 6 The prospective voter's race is one of the few pieces of individual-
ized information available to the poll worker, and is exactly the
information that should not be used. 197
Thus, judgment calls made quickly with little individuating infor-
mation create a foundation for the operation of unconscious bias.
However, motivation to avoid bias can help lessen the likelihood of its
operation. Motivation can be either internal ("I would like to behave in
an unbiased manner") or external ("People will judge me negatively if I
behave in a biased manner"). 9 a Either kind of motivation can make a dif-
ference, although it is probably easier to change external motivations.
Within reason, the more incentives a subject has, the more likely he or
she can reach an unbiased decision. 199 In addition, the more that the deci-
193. See, e.g., Patricia W. Linville et al., Stereotyping and Perceived Distributions of Social
Characteristics: An Application to Ingroup-Outgroup Perception, in PREJUDICE, DISCRIMINATION,
AND RACISM 165, 167 (John F Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner eds., 1986).
194. See Susan T. Fiske, What's in a Category?: Responsibility, Intent, and the Avoidability
of Bias Against Outgroups, in THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF GOOD AND EVIL 127, 129 (Arthur
G. Miller ed., 2004).
195. If unconscious bias is less likely to occur when poll workers have more informa-
tion about voters, the fact that the poll worker knows a prospective voter (because they are
friends, neighbors, etc.) would serve to reduce the opportunity for unconscious bias.
However, in most modern elections, prospective voters are not likely to know the poll
workers they encounter, presumably because precincts are so large. See Alvarez et al., supra
note 78, at 18 (survey of voters at 2008 general election showing that "only 17% of voters
reported that they knew the poll worker personally").
196. The information contained in poll books varies from state to state and can vary
from voter to voter. For example, poll books often have a special notation to alert poll
workers as to which first time voters who registered by mail still need to present identifi-
cation to comply with the voter identification mandate of the Help America Vote Act.
There will also be whatever evidence the voter is required to present for identification
purposes (which can vary from state to state).
197. The poll worker will also likely have the potential voter's age and sex.
198. See Patricia G. Devine et al., The Regulation of Explicit and Implicit Race Bias:The
Role of Motivations to Respond Without Prejudice, 82 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 835,
836 (2002) (finding the more internally motivated the subject was to avoid prejudice, the
lower their measure of implicit race bias).
199. Devine et al., supra note 198, at 845; E. Ashby Plant & Patricia G. Devine, Inter-
nal and External Motivation to Respond Without Prejudice, 75 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
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sion-maker expects to be accountable for and to have to justify the deci-
sion, the less likely the decision will be biased.
Unfortunately, poll workers' external motivations may not be par-
ticularly malleable. Poll workers tend to be low wage employees working
just a couple of days per year with limited training. There are also few or
no rewards for success and little or no accountability. ' As noted previ-
ously, a poll worker makes generally unreviewable and unevaluated
decisions, and rarely has the opportunity to learn from mistakes. A poll
worker who decides to prevent a prospective voter from casting a ballot is
unlikely to learn whether this was the correct decision. Even in those
situations where accountability is readily achievable, such as ensuring poll
workers correctly complete the paperwork necessary for a provisional
ballot to be counted, there is little accountability. Finally, even if there
were significant performance evaluation of poll workers, there are no in-
centives, financial or otherwise, for high performance.
In short, although the ubiquity of unconscious bias remains in dis-
pute, poll workers on election day appear to be in a situation likely to
exacerbate such biases. Unreviewed discretionary decisions, potentially
made under time constraints, with little individuating information, and no
accountability or incentives for accuracy, are particularly susceptible to
unconscious bias.
The next step involves identifying concrete instances in which un-
conscious bias might occur during the interaction between poll workers
and potential voters. While we think there are many instances in which
unconscious bias might operate, here are several examples where uncon-
scious bias might play a role:
02
When poll workers make requests for identification, they
might choose to request identification from minority
prospective voters but notWhite prospective voters.
811 (1998); Lisa Sinclair & Ziva Kunda, Reactions to a Black Professional: Motivated Inhibition
and Activation of Conflicting Stereotypes, 77 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 885, passin
(1999). There is a risk, however, of overcompensation. See Bridget C. Dunton & Russell H.
Fazio, An Individual Difference Measure of Motivation to Control Prejudiced Reactions, 23 PER-
SONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 316, 324 (1997).
200. See, e.g., Phillip E Tetlock & Jennifer S. Lerner, The Social Contingency Model:
Identifying Empirical and Normative Boundary Conditions on the Error-and-Bias Portrait of Hu-
man Nature, in DUAL PROCESS THEORIES IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 160, at 571.
201. Steven L. Neuberg & Susan T. Fiske, Motivational Influences on Impression Forma-
tion: Outcome Dependence, Accuracy-Driven Attention, and Individuating Processes, 53 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 431 (1987) (finding that incentives may reduce bias).
202. In each case the situation is described from a baseline where the poll workers'
behavior is wrongful. It is also possible that the poll workers' treatment of the minority
potential voter is correct, but for the fact that a non-minority potential voter would be
treated better.
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When poll workers make decisions about the adequacy
of voter identification, they might be more likely to de-
termine that a type of identification is inadequate when a
minority prospective voter presents the identification.
" When poll workers have difficulty finding the name of a
prospective voter, they might search less diligently for a
minority prospective voter.
" When poll workers are resolving challenges by poll
watchers, poll workers might be more likely to rule
against minority than non-minority prospective voters.
" When poll workers are filling out forms necessary to
legitimate a voter (e.g., provisional balloting forms/
affidavits), poll workers might be less careful with the
forms or might provide less assistance to the prospective
voter when a minority prospective voter is involved.
" When poll workers are providing assistance to the voter
in the voting booth (e.g., helping with equipment), poll
workers may provide a lower quality of assistance to mi-
nority voters.
When poll workers are deciding whether a voter has ex-
ceeded the time limit for occupying the voting booth,
they might enforce the time limit against minority per-
sons and not enforce the time limit against White
203persons.
When poll workers are deciding whether a potential
voter has arrived at the polling place before the polls
have closed, poll workers might decide to close the polls
if it's a minority voter
Importantly, unconscious bias may operate in such a way that it is
hard to detect whether the bias is unconscious or even whether there is
bias at all. For instance, take a poll worker's decision as to whether a voter
has arrived at the polls just prior to closing or just after closing. It is
unlikely that one minority prospective voter and one White prospective
voter will arrive at the same time at the same polling place and be treated
differently. Instead, what may happen is that at one polling place, a minor-
ity voter arrives and unconscious bias on the part of a poll worker leads
the poll worker to disallow the prospective minority voter from casting a
203. At the 2004 general election in New York City, there were reports that poll
workers were pressuring Asian American voters to cast their ballots quickly. See AALDEF,
supra note 65 ("Several Asian American voters told AALDEF monitors that they felt
rushed when they were voting.").
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ballot whereas (1) if the prospective voter had been White, the poll
worker would have made a different decision; or (2) at a different precinct
on the opposite side of town, a White prospective voter has arrived at the
same moment and poll workers allowed that prospective voter to cast a
ballot. In other words, unconscious bias may operate very subtly.
III. IMPLICATIONS & IMPROVEMENTS
Unconscious bias may well play a role in the interaction between
prospective voters and poll workers. The quick, discretionary decisions
made by poll workers where they have few points of individuating infor-
mation may result in poll workers making choices that exclude African
Americans and other ethnic minorities who should be allowed to cast
ballots.
While the research involving unconscious bias suggests polling
places present a theoretical "optimal" opportunity for unconscious bias, it
is not possible at this point to say how often unconscious bias plays a role
in poll worker decision-making. However, we do know that in federal
general elections it is likely that thousands of voters do not have their bal-





registration issues, or the failure of a voting device to record a vote
properly.2°6 And there is some evidence that White and non-White voters
have different experiences at America's polling places. For instance, a na-
tionwide survey of voters from the 2008 general election showed that
African American and Latino voters were far more likely to be asked for
photo identification than White voters. Another possible example of
204. Stephen Ansolabehere, Effects of Identification Requirements on Voting: Evidence from
the Experiences of Voters on Election Day, 42 PS: Pol. Sci. & Pol. 127, 129 (2009) (providing
statistics on the number of voters who reported not being allowed to cast a ballot because
of identification problems).
205. See Daniel PTokaji, Voter Registration and Election Reform, 17 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 1, 24 (2008) (describing how nearly 75,000 provisional ballots were rejected in
2006 because of issues with voter registration).
206. See generally Daniel P. Tokaji, The Paperless Chase: Electronic Voting and Democratic
Values, 73 FORDHA L. REv. 1711 (2005) (providing statistics on error rates for various
types of voting machinery).
207. Alvarez et al., supra note 78, at 43 (reporting that 51% of White voters, 65% of
Hispanic voters, and 70% of African American voters were asked to show "picture" identi-
fication). Importantly, the disparities among requests for photo identification persisted even
after controlling for variations among states in their identification laws. Id. at 44. It is also
interesting that there was actually less disparity in identification requests in states with
stricter identification laws than in states with less stringent identification laws. In states
with stricter identification laws (i.e., states that require or allow poll workers to request
identification from prospective voters), 83% ofWhites, 89% ofAfrican Americans, and 75%
of Hispanics were asked to show photo identification. Id. In states with less stringent iden-
tification laws, 22% of Whites, 44% of African Americans, and 51% of Hispanics were
asked to show photo identification. Id.
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different treatment due to unconscious bias might be found in racial dis-
parities in provisional balloting rates. A 2004 survey of provisional
balloting showed a higher rate of provisional ballots in jurisdictions cov-
ered by the minority-language provisions of Section 203 of the Voting
Rights Act than in non-covered jurisdictions.20 8 Relatedly, predominantly
Latino jurisdictions had the highest rate of provisional balloting.2 9
Of course, it bears reiterating that there could be reasons other than
unconscious bias for prospective voters being rejected and for the differ-
ent experiences minority persons have at the polls. For example, the
higher rate of provisional balloting in predominantly Latino jurisdictions
might be explained by intentional, rather than implicit, bias on the part of
poll workers. At this point, is impossible to know how many of these ex-
amples of differential treatment are manifestations of unconscious bias.
That recognized, our goal here is not to define empirically how often
unconscious bias occurs.210 Rather, it is to advance the idea that uncon-
scious bias may be occurring and to suggest reasonable steps legislators
and election administrators might take to limit the impact of unconscious
bias. Put differently, our point here is that unconscious bias should be
included in the dialogue regarding election administration.
We think, then, that legislators and election administrators have
some options should they attempt to mitigate the role of unconscious bias
on election day. Legislators and election administrators can take these
steps at both an individual level and an institutional, or structural, level. At
an individual level, legislators and election administrators could focus on
the poll workers themselves. Broadly speaking, there are measures that at
an unconscious level may change a person's implicit associations or may
mitigate the impact of these associations. At an institutional level, legisla-
tors and election administrators could restructure the overall voting
environment so as to reduce the impact of poll worker decisions. This
could mean reducing the number and role of poll workers through vari-
ous forms of automation and computerization, or less ambitiously, by
208. Kimball W Brace & Michael P McDonald, Final Report of the 2004 Election Day
Survey 6-6 (2005).
209. Id.
210. It would be difficult to run an empirical experiment to determine the impact of
unconscious bias in polling places. One could, presumably, survey poll workers for their
racial attitudes and then send similarly situated African American voters and White voters
to the same polling place on election day to see if workers approached these voters differ-
ently. There would, however, seemingly be high barriers to such a study. First, it would
take enormous resources. Second, it would take cooperation on the part of government
officials because to conduct such a study, the prospective voters would have to be given
matching "attributes" and to do this correctly one would likely have to rely on prospective
voters who might be considered fraudulent under criminal law.
211. Judges may also be able to play a role in the application of unconscious bias to
election law if, for example, they are willing to use unconscious bias as a rationale to limit
the application of laws that explicitly allow poll worker discretion.
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clarifying the rules that poll workers must follow so as to reduce poll
workers' discretion (and providing effective enforcement to ensure that
the bright-line rules are followed).
There are, however, some drawbacks to these approaches. First, it is
no simple task to counteract unconscious bias.-2 On the contrary, coun-
teracting unconscious bias at an individual level takes a lot of effort.1
Professors Wilson and Brekke use a metaphor, contamination, to describe
the impact of unwanted unconscious bias on an individual's decision-
making.-t4 As the metaphor suggests, restoring something to an uncon-
taminated state frequently presents difficulties-just ask the
Environmental Protection Agency. Second, there is a risk of unintended
consequences in changing election administration to offset occurrences of
unconscious bias. For example, a change in the way elections are con-
ducted to decrease the potential for unconscious bias might have the
unintended consequence of making it more difficult for the groups who
need the most protection from unconscious bias (i.e., racial and ethnic
minorities) to cast a countable ballot. Such a change might also make the
smooth administration of elections more difficult. In short, while we pre-
sent in the next few pages several ideas to mitigate the impact of
unconscious bias at polling places, some of these ideas remain tentative
and each likely merits further, more detailed treatment than can be pro-
vided within the confines of this Article.
A. Individual Level: Training and Priming Poll Workers Not to Discriminate
Legislators and election administrators could attempt to reduce the
operation of unconscious bias in poll workers' decisions, either by reduc-
ing poll workers' implicit biases or by helping them to override their
biases. Although typically implicit biases are thought to be relatively resil-
ient,2 15 particularly if they have developed over many years, 21 6 there is
evidence that these biases in some circumstances are malleable or that
their effects can be minimized.2 7 Some relatively modest interventions
212. See generally Jeffrey W Sherman, The Self Regulation of Automatic Associations and
Behavioral Impulses, 115 PsYcHoL. REv. 314 (2008).
213. See generally Id. Cunningham et al., supra note 173, at 806 (noting that counter-
acting individual bias is effortful).
214. Timothy D. Wilson & Nancy Brekke, Mental Contamination and Mental Correc-
tion: Unwanted Influences on Judgments and Evaluations, 116 PsYcHoL. BULL. 117, 119 (1994).
215. See, e.g., Timothy D. Wilson, et al., A Model of Dual Attitudes, 107 PSYCHOL. REV.
101 (2000).
216. Laurie A. Rudman, Sources of Implicit Attitudes, 13 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSY-
CHOL. Sci. 79 (2004).
217. See Irene V. Blair, The Malleability of Automatic Stereotypes and Prejudice, 6 PERSON-
ALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 242,242-43 (2002) (reviewing studies).
FALL 2009] Poll Workers
Michigan Journal of Race & Law
have been shown to have an impact,18 which is fortunate for our pur-
poses because more intensive interventions may not be justifiable for
employees who typically only serve a few days per year.219
One possible approach would be based on the finding that mere ex-
220posure to minority groups, and to positive examples of minority groups,
can make a difference.22 The former finding suggests that greater diversity
among poll workers could result in less individual implicit bias.222 It is
even possible that exposure to a photograph can help.223 Simply promi-
nently displaying photographs of positive role models, such as Tiger
Woods voting, might have beneficial effects. In addition, if minority group
members can be hired for positions of authority, such as the lead poll
worker, this too may help. 24 In one study, for example, subjects showed
less automatic racial bias when an African American rather than a White
gave the subjects their instructions.
218. See, e.g., Tiffany A. Ito et al., The Influence of Facial Feedback on Race Bias, 17 Psy-
CHOL. Sci. 256 (2006) (finding that inducing subjects to smile resulted in less racial bias).
219. In addition, interventions that have worked in lab experiments may prove inef-
fective in the poll worker context.
220. This exposure effect, also referred to as the contact hypothesis, goes back at least
50 years. See GORDON W ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE (Addison-Wesley 1958)
(1954). See also, Thomas E Pettigrew & Linda R. Tropp, A Meta-analytic Test of Intergroup
Contact Theory, 90 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOt. 751 (2006) (providing a review of
studies and concluding that contact reduces bias).
221. Nilanjana Dasgupta & Anthony G. Greenwald, On the Malleability of Automatic
Attitudes: Combating Automatic Prejudice With Images of Admired and Disliked Individuals, 81 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 800, 806-07 (2001) (demonstrating that using photographs
of admired minority group members like Colin Powell and Tiger Woods, or disliked Cau-
casians, like the "Unabomber," reduced unconscious bias); Laurie A. Rudman et al.,
"Unlearning" Automatic Biases: The Malleability of Implicit Prejudice and Stereotypes, 81 J. PER-
SONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 856, 865 (2001) (finding that a seminar on prejudice with an
African American professor reduced the differences on an IAT by a considerable amount
when compared to a similar class taught by aWhite professor).
222. As explained infra at notes 282-286 and accompanying text, minority group
members may have different biases thereby reducing (albeit not eliminating) any system-
atic impact.
223. See Dasgupta & Greenwald, supra note 221 at 806-07.
224. See, e.g., Jennifer A. Richeson & Nalini Ambady, Effects of Situational Power on
Automatic Racial Prejudice, 39 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 177, 181 (2003) (finding that
participants showed less automatic racial bias when they expected to be a subordinate to
an African American rather than when they expected to be a superior of an African
American).
225. Brian S. Lowery et al., Social Influence Effects on Automatic Racial Prejudice, 81 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 842,851 (2001).
[VOL. 15:1
226Training might also be effective. For instance, police officers and
undergraduates in a computer simulation were initially more likely to
227mistakenly shoot African Americans than Whites. After extensive prac-
tice, however, neither group showed the automatic bias. A followup
test suggested they were inhibiting racial stereotypes. 29 Perhaps something
similar could be done with poll workers. Computer-based training ses-
sions could be programmed so that race was demonstrated to be irrelevant
to determining voter eligibility. Encouraging empathy may also have
some success, as does exposing people to multicultural viewpoints.230
Other kinds of training may also be partially effective, such as counter-
231 ,23stereotype imaging, approach behaviors, 232 or even just practice in
226. See Rudman et al., supra note 221, at 865 (presenting research suggesting that
diversity education can reduce implicit anti-Black bias). But cf Alexander Kalev et al., Best
Practices or Best Guesses? Assessing The Efficacy Of Corporate Affirmative Action And Diversity
Policies, 71 AM. SOCIOL. REV. 589, 611 (2006) (reporting on a meta-analysis showing that
diversity training had "virtually no effect").
227. E.Ashby Plant & B. Michelle Peruche, The Consequences of Race for Police Officers
Response to Criminal Suspects, 16 PSYCHOL. SCI. 180 (2005) (reporting police officers' re-
sponses);Ashby Plant et al., Eliminating Automatic Racial Bias: Making Race Non-Diagnostic for
Responses to Criminal Suspects, 41 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYcHOL. 141 (2005) (reporting
students' responses). See also http://backhand.uchicago.edu/Center/ShooterEffect/ (ac-
cessed July 17, 2008) (showing a version of shooter simulation).
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Jennifer A. Richeson & Richard J. Nussbaum, The Impact of Multiculturalism Ver-
sus Color-Blindness on Racial Bias, 40 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 417, 420 (2004)
(finding that multicultural training, but not color-blindness training, led to a reduction in
bias). In popular fiction, John Grisham's A TIME TO KILL uses this device. A divided jury
delivers a defendant's verdict after expressly considering how they would think about the
case if the defendant were White rather than African American. JOHN GRISHAM, A TIME TO
KILL 510 (1992).
231. Irene V Blair et al., Imagining Stereotypes Away: The Moderation of Implicit Stereo-
types Through Mental Inagery, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 828, 837 (2001); Kerry
Kawakami et al.,Just Say No (to Stereotyping): Effects of Training in the Negation of Stereotypic
Associations on Stereotype Activation, 78 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 871, 884 (2000)
(demonstrating that training subjects to negate stereotypes reduced their unconscious use
of stereotypes). Adam Goldyne, for example, suggests a long list of questions that experts
may ask themselves to alert themselves to the possibility of unconscious bias, but notes that
"[plroactive bias detection is challenging." Adam J. Goldyne, Minimizing the Influence of
Unconscious Bias in Evaluations:A Practical Guide, 35 J Am. AcAD PSYCHIATRY LAW 60 (2007).
232. Psychologists have demonstrated that "approach behaviors," i.e. pulling towards
the body, can create positive feelings about something to which it is linked. So, for exam-
ple, subjects who flexed their palms towards themselves were more positive about Chinese
symbols than those who flexed their palms away from themselves. See J.T. Cacioppo et al.,
Rudimentary Determinants of Attitudes: Arm Flexion and Extension Have Differential Effects on
Attitudes, 65 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 5, 5 (1993).Training in approach behaviors
has been shown to reduce implicit racial bias and increase openness in nonverbal behav-
iors. Kerry Kawakami et al., (Close) Distance Makes the Heart Grow Fonder: Improving Implicit
Racial Attitudes and Interracial Interactions Through Approach Behaviors, 92 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 957, 967 (2007).
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distinguishing among faces of people of different races from the viewer.
Confronting people regarding explicitly held stereotypes has also proved
effective.3
We recognize that given finite time and money, extensive employee
training (or retraining) may not be the most practical option as it will re-
sult in less training in other areas. For example, as the machinery used in
voting has become increasingly complicated, training poll workers on the
proper set-up and operation of the machines undoubtedly needs to be
prioritized. Nevertheless, there may be some minor adjustments to train-
ing procedures that could help reduce the operation of unconscious bias
on election day.
Alternatively (or, perhaps, additionally) legislators and election ad-
ministrators could help poll workers attempt to consciously override
biases.2 3 - At a minimum this requires that poll workers be aware of the
potential for unconscious bias236 and motivated to minimize its impact.
237
This may be harder than it first appears. Although people are quite ready
to find bias in the actions of others, they are much less likely to accept
that their own decisions may be biased. We appear to suffer from
"bounded ethicality,' ' 239 a "bias blind spot, ' 240 or "the illusion of objectiv-
ity.'21' Part of this results from the commonly held view that we have
233. Sophie Lebrecht et al., Perceptual Other-Race Training Reduces Implicit Racial Bias,
PLoS ONE,Jan. 21, 2009.
234. Alexander M. Czopp et al., Standing up for a Change: Reducing Bias through Inter-
personal Confrontation, 90J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 784,799 (2006).
235. There is some risk, given that there is evidence that consciously attempting not
to use a stereotype can increase its use. Richard M.Wenzlaff& Daniel M.Wegner, Thought
Suppression, 51 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 59, 79-80 (2000) (citing studies).
236. Bertram Gawronski et al., Implicit Bias in Inpression Formation: Associations Influ-
ence the Construal of Individuating Information, 33 EUR. J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 573, 585 (2003)
(arguing that knowledge of unconscious biases may result in adjustment).
237. See, e.g. Fazio et al., supra note 151 (providing a model); Wilson & Brekke, supra
note 214. Adequate time for decision-making may also be necessary, and is discussed infra
at notes 276-279, and accompanying text.
238. People's ability to see the bias of others is reflected in the biblical quotation,
"[aind why beholdest thou the more that is in thy brother's eye, but considerest not the
beam that is in thine own eye?" Matthew 7:3 (King James), quoted in Enily Pronin et al.,
Objectivity in the Eye of the Beholder: Divergent Perceptions of Bias in Self Versus Others, 111
PSYCHOL. REV. 781,781 (2004).
239. Dolly Chugh et al., Bounded Ethicality as a Psychological Barrier to Recognizing
Conflicts of Interest, in CONFLICTS OF INTEREST: CHALLENGES AND SOLUTIONS IN BusirEss,
LAW, MEDICINE, AND PUBLIC POLICY 74, 74-75 (Don A. Moore et al. eds, 2005).
240. Emily Pronin et al., The Bias Blind Spot: Perceptions of Bias in Self Versus Others, 28
PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. BULL. 369,369 (2002).
241. Tom Pyszczynski & Jeff Greenberg, Toward an Integration of Cognitive and Motiva-
tional Perspectives on Social Inference: A Biased Hypothesis- Testing Model, in 20 ADVANCES IN
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCH. 297, 317 (1987) (arguing that the unconscious allows us "to
maintain an illusion of objectivity" regarding how we reach our decisions).
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complete knowledge of the causes of our decision-making, or that the
causes are transparent. Another contributing factor is our general self-
enhancement bias: we are better than average decision-makers, and better
than average at avoiding biases, just as nearly all of us think we are better
243than average drivers. Yet another contributing factor is our sense that we
see the world as it is, a kind of "naive realism. 244 Finally, our ability to
self-deceive is not only "common, normal, and accepted as constant and
pervasive" but almost limitless245 (after all, if we could see that we were
fooling ourselves, we would lose the ability to do so).
The fact that people are resistant to acknowledging their own biases
is no reason not to try this approach, particularly because there may be an
impact at the unconscious level. In the poll worker context, awareness
could be as simple as including a short paragraph in poll worker training
materials. This paragraph could simply note that people sometimes make
decisions based in whole or in part on a person's race without the deci-
sion-maker being consciously aware of these factors, and stress that these
decisions are both immoral and illegal. Another way poll workers' aware-
ness might be improved would be through swearing an oath prior to the
opening of the polls. In Indiana, for example, before the polls open each
worker swears an oath to, among other things, uphold the United States
246Constitution and preserve the secrecy of all ballots cast by voters. To
242. See, e.g., Ap J. Dijksterhuis & Loran F Nordgren, A Theory of Unconscious Thought,
1 PERSP. ON PSYCHOL. SCI. 95, 98 (2006).
243. See generally Justin Kruger, Lake Wobegon Be Gone! The "Below-Average Effect" and
the Egocentric Nature of Comparative Ability Judgments, 77 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
221, 221 (1999) (observing that a majority of people seem to believe that they are "more
athletic, intelligent, organized, ethical, logical, interesting, fair-minded, and healthy--not to
mention more attractive" than average). One author recalls presenting work on uncon-
scious bias in the context of the peremptory challenge. A former prosecutor approached
the author after the talk to express his agreement with the claim that other attorneys had
often shown such biases.The prosecutor, however, claimed that he had no such biases.
244. Robert J. Robinson et al., Actual Versus Assumed Differences in Construal: "Naive
Realism" in Intergroup Perception and Conflict, 68 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 404, 404
(1995).
245. See Anne E. Tenbrunsel & David M. Messick, Ethical Fading: 'The Role of Self-
Deception in Unethical Behavior, 17 SOc.JusT. REs. 223, 225 (2004) (observing that "[wie are
creative narrators of stories that tend to allow us to do what we want and that justify what
we have done. We believe our stories and thus believe that we are objective about our-
selves.").
246. Before the polls are opened in a precinct, poll workers must take an oath to
"faithfully discharge their duties." IND. CODE § 3-6-6-19 (2006). The oath that must be
taken by a precinct election officer reads as follows:
I do solemenly swear and affirm the following:
(1) I will support the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution
of the State of Indiana.
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mitigate unconscious bias, workers might be required to swear affirma-
tively that they will not discriminate on the basis of race. 2" Although this
would appear to have an impact only on conscious decision-making, this• • • 248
emphasis on ideals can also affect unconscious decision-making. In psy-
(2) 1 will faithfully and impartially discharge the duties of inspector (or judge,
poll clerk, assistant poll clerk, or sheriff) of the precinct under the law.
(3) 1 will not knowingly permit any person to vote who is not qualified and
will not knowingly refuse the vote of any qualified voter or cause any delay
to any person offering to vote other than is necessary to procure satisfactory
information of the qualification of that person as a voter.
(4) I am now a bona fide resident of the county in which the precinct in
which I am to act as a member of the election board is situated and, if re-
quired by law, am a qualified voter of that county.
(5) I will not disclose or communicate to any person how any voter has
voted at this election or how any ballot has been folded or marked.
(6) I am able to read, write, and speak the English language.
(7) I have no property bet or wagered on the result of this election.
(8) I am not a candidate to be voted for at this election in this precinct, ex-
cept as an unopposed candidate for a political party office.
(9) If I am serving as an inspector, I am not the chairman or treasurer of the
committee of a candidate whose name appears on the ballot.
(10) I am not related to any person to be voted for at this election in this
precinct as the spouse, parent, father-in-law, mother-in-law, child, son-in-law,
daughter-in-law, grandparent, grandchildren, brother, sister, brother-in-law,
sister-in-law, uncle, aunt, nephew, or niece of that person, unless that person
is an unopposed candidate.
(11) I was trained as required by IC 3-6-6-40.
IND. CODE § 3-6-6-23 (LexisNexis 2009).
In addition, IND. CODE § 3-11-8-14 requires the precinct inspector to read Indiana
Code § 3-14-4-7 to the election board. Ind. Code Ann. § 3-11-8-14 (LexisNexis 2009). It
also requires each member of the precinct election board to take an oath that the member
has not violated and will not violate the Indiana Code § 3-14-4-7. !d. Indiana Code § 3-
14-4-7 reads as follows: "A member of a precinct election board or a person otherwise
entitled to the inspection of the ballot who knowingly (1) reveals to another person how a
voter voted; or (2) gives information concerning the appearance of any ballot voted;
Commits a Class D felony" Id.
247. See Irene V. Blair et al., Automatic and Controlled Processes in Stereotype Priming, 70
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1142 (1996) (finding that instructing participants to at-
tempt to avoid prejudicial evaluations had some success).
248. In fact, even emphasizing positive goals, like fairness, without the awareness of
participants reduces the unconscious use of stereotypes. See John A. Bargh et al., The Auto-
matic Will: Nonconscious Activation and the Pursuit of Behavioral Goals, 81 J. PERSONALITY &
Soc. PSYCHOL. 1014, 1017 (2001).
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chological terms, by raising the salience of our egalitarian norms we make
it easier to enact them.249
The second factor, poll workers' motivation, is also malleable.2'0 Poll
workers are likely to have both internal and external motivations. Poll
workers operating in good faith are internally motivated to reduce the
impact of impermissible unconscious bias on their decision-making. For
other poll workers who are less internally committed to unbiased deci-
sion-making, it might be possible to create external incentives. Incentives,
of course, can take many forms. Most people are motivated to view them-
selves as competent and moral, and making voting decisions based on
permissible criteria is consistent with that view.2"1 For many, the intrinsic
reward of knowing that a job was performed well is adequate. This sug-
gests that some form of feedback would be helpful. Positive reinforcement
and extrinsic rewards, such as praise and recognition (perhaps certificates
for exceptionally good poll workers) could also help. 152 Finally, if budgets
permit, financial recognition could be used. Punishment could also play a
role. Poll workers who are involved with suspect decisions could be ineli-
gible for future employment as poll workers, or be required to undergo
extra training for subsequent elections.253
There are at least three realistic approaches one might take to
provide improved feedback and to incentivize better poll worker deci-
sion-making. First, instead of using poll workers who have volunteered
from the citizenry at large, perhaps it would be better to use government
employees as poll workers. 254 There may be more incentive for a full-time
government employee to properly administer polling place rules than
there is for a two-day-a-year employee to properly apply such rules.
Moreover, it may be easier to coordinate training of government employ-
ees in some of the strategies outlined above. Indeed, training government
249. See Kunda & Spencer, supra note 192, at 532.
250. Even when a person's motivation to control bias is itself nonconcious, implicit
bias' impact can be reduced. See Jack Glaser & Eric D. Knowles, Implicit Motivation to Con-
trol Prejudice, 44 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 164 (2008); Gordon Moskowitz et al.,
Preconscious Control of Stereotype Activation Through Chronic Egalitarian Goals, 77 J. PERSONAL-
ITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 167 (1999) (finding that the higher subjects scored on a measure of
egalitarianism the more likely they were to inhibit the use of implicit stereotypes).
251. Chugh et al., supra note 239, at 75-76.
252. Many studies have demonstrated that non cash-rewards can be extremely pow-
erful motivators.
253. Granted, given the wage and working conditions of poll workers, on its face this
may not be a very effective punishment.
254. Several jurisdictions have already used government employees as poll workers
due to difficulties in recruiting and retaining poll workers. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE
5 3501.28(G)(1); U.S. Election Assistance Commission, Successful Practices for Poll Worker
Recruitment, Training and Retention 7, 41-43 (2007) (describing how "[r]ecruiting poll work-
ers is an ongoing challenge" and providing tips on recruiting government employees as
poll workers).
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employees in mitigating unconscious bias on election day could have a
secondary benefit of mitigating unconscious bias in the general provision
of government services . Second, it might be possible to create better
election-day oversight of poll workers to facilitate good behavior. For ex-
ample, in New Jersey, the decision of poll workers to deny the right to
vote (or to offer a provisional ballot) can be subjected to an election-day
hearing before a state court judge who may then issue an order instruct-
ing poll workers to provide a regular ballot to the prospective voter.26
Third, it might be possible to test poll workers at random to determine
whether they are engaging in bias. This would, in essence, be an election-
day version of the tests conducted for housing discrimination.257
In the end, we make no claim that the elimination of unconscious
bias among individual poll workers through training initiatives or incen-
tive structures will be easy. However, we think it would be useful to
explore possible approaches to reducing unconscious bias while recogniz-
ing that any approach adopted would need to be carefully monitored and
studied to ensure effectiveness.
B. Institutional Level: The Voting Environment
This Article suggests that polling places are a particularly fertile place
for unconscious bias to operate.258 As such, polling places could be reor-
ganized (or perhaps even eliminated!) so that the effects of unconscious
bias are reduced. At the outset, though, we want to re-emphasize that at
255. Although it is possible for authorities to be more sensitive to the possibility of
unconscious bias in their hiring decisions, we do not think this is particularly feasible. Cf
AYRs, supra note 123, at 424-35 (suggesting that government and nongovernmental hir-
ing could use an applicant's unconscious bias as a hiring criterion). First, there is generally
very little selectivity in the hiring of poll workers. The job is not well compensated and
election administrators frequently need to hire whoever applies. Second, even if there were
more screening, the instruments that measure (or purport to measure) unconscious bias
remain controversial. See, e.g,, Hart Blanton et al., Strong Claims and Weak Evidence: Reas-
sessing the Predictive Validity of the IAT, J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. (forthcoming 2009). In the
absence of direct evidence, election administrators could only base hiring on broad stereo-
types. For example, older people may show higher levels of unconscious bias. See Project
Imphcit, https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/demo/background/index.jsp (last visited Nov.
30, 2009) (reporting that people over the age of sixty show 5-10 percent more bias than
people under 60). But even if it was pragmatically feasible to exclude older persons from
being poll workers, it might be perceived as immoral discrimination against the elderly.
256. See Askin, supra note 48. Of course, the judges who make these election-day
decisions could, themselves, be infected by unconscious bias. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al.,
Does Unconscious Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE Dse L. REv. 1195 (2009) (concluding
that judges can consciously mitigate the impact of their unconscious biases).
257. See, e.g.,Jancik v. Dep't of Hous. and Urban Dev., 44 F3d 553, 554-55 (7th Cir.
1995) (describing housing discrimination test where similarly situated African Americans
and Whites apply for apartment rentals).
258. See supra notes 180-202 and accompanying text.
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this point it is not possible to know how many votes are lost due to un-
conscious bias, so wholesale changes to election administration may be
unjustified. However, many of the suggestions below have been advocated
for other reasons. For instance, one of the possible solutions we mention
below is election-day registration, which has also been touted as a way to
improve overall voter access.While we agree that unconscious bias in and
of itself may not provide justification for a wholesale structural change,
such as election-day registration, we think that unconscious bias provides
at least a partial theoretical justification for structural change. In other
words, unconscious bias might not suffice as the sole reason for imple-
menting some of the proposals mentioned below, but it might serve as
one of several reasons for implementing some of the proposals.
Eliminate (to the Extent Possible) Poll Workers. Unconscious bias has an
impact during poll workers' decision-making. 9 Reducing the role of poll
workers in the voting process would thus lessen the impact of uncon-
scious bias. One obvious way to reduce the role of poll workers in the
election process would be to eliminate polling places entirely. For exam-
ple, the state of Oregon now conducts its elections by mail, thus
eliminating the need for poll workers to staff sites on election day.260 An-
other potential way of eliminating (or at least reducing) the need for
polling places would be to use the Internet as a means of casting ballots.
Although currently Internet voting is not widely available for the election
of public officials, 61 one county in Florida tested Internet voting for over-
262
seas voters at the 2008 presidential election. 2Of course, there could be
drawbacks to these approaches-both related to racial bias in particular
259. We recognize that unconscious bias may also have an impact on simple human
interaction. For instance, apart from denying voting rights to minorities, unconscious bias
could lead poll workers to treat prospective minority voters in a less than civil manner. We
also recognize that legislators' and election administrators' decisions could be impacted by
unconscious bias, albeit at a very different stage. These are, however, two subjects to be
tackled on another day.
260. For a more detailed description of Oregon's vote by mail process, see Oregon
Secretary of State's Office, Election Division, Vote by Mail, available at http://
www.sos.state.or.us/elections/vbm/index.html (last visited Nov. 30, 2009); see also Paul
Gronke, Ballot Integrity and Voting by Mail: The Oregon Experience 8 (June 15,
2005), available at http://people.reed.edu/-gronkep/docs/Carter°/20Baker°/20Report-
publicrelease.pdf (last visited Nov. 30, 2009) (explaining voting by mail process). There
would still be a question of whether to count a vote or not, but the race of the voter is
unavailable to the vote counter after the ballot has been cast (unless the counter has access
on the voter list to the race of the voter).
261. Elections of corporate directors, even for those with hundreds of thousands of
shareholders, routinely involve Internet voting. See, e.g. Boeing Investor Relations: Annual
Meeting of Shareholders, http://www.boeing.com/companyoffices/financial/annual.htm
(last visited Nov. 30, 2009).
262. Erik Sofge, Internet Voting in Florida Raises Security Concerns: Geek the Vote, Popu-
LAR ME c sIcs (Oct. 22, 2008), available at http://www.popularmechanics.com/
technology/industry/4288327.html (last visited Nov. 30, 2009).
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and election administration more generally.With respect to racial bias, the
racial disparity in Internet access at this point might be too vast to justify
'63
such a move: With respect to election administration generally, non-
polling place voting might introduce additional opportunities for fraud.264
Nevertheless, a move away from the traditional election day polling
place/poll worker model would reduce the operation of unconscious bias
on election day.
Even if the current election day polling place model is retained, it
may be possible to reduce the element of human decision-making
through the use of technology. Although it may not yet be politically
acceptable in the United States, an extreme version of this would be to
allow voting based only on biometric identification. Retinal, iris, or fin-
gerprint scanning and matching could be accomplished solely by a
266
computer. Indeed, some countries have begun such biometric projects.
A computer program would then determine whether a voter could cast a
regular ballot, a provisional ballot, or no ballot at all. Granted, biometric
assessments may not yet be fool-proof 6 7 and there might still be debate
on what criteria to use for the computer program, but at least such deci-
sions could be discussed and made transparently in advance (potentially
with judicial review), as opposed to poll workers' rapid, largely concealed,
and relatively unreviewable decisions.
Eliminate (to the Extent Possible) De Jure Poll Worker Discretion. Biased
decision-making is less likely the more precise and complete the rules are.
The more rules are like bright-line rules, and the less they are like stan-
dards, the less latitude exists for unconscious bias to operate. For example,
part of the issue with photo identification results from an ambiguously
worded law on voter identification coupled with an absence of clear and
comprehensive guidance as to which names on photo identifications will
263. See generally Stephen B. Pershing, The Voting Rights Act in the Internet Age: An
Equal Access Theory for Interesting Times, 34 LoYoLA L.A. L. REV. 1171 (2001) (discussing
whether internet voting discriminates against minority voters in violation of the Voting
Rights Act).
264. Sofge, supra note 262; see also Gronke, supra note 260, at 4 (noting the potential
for fraud when voting by mail).
265. Matthew M. Johnson, Souder Says Biometrics the Solution, but Others Curse the
Cure, CQ POLITIcs, Nov. 21, 2007, http://www.cqpolitics.com/wmspage.cfin?parml=
5&doclD-hsnews-000002632196 (last visited Nov. 30, 2009) (quoting Indiana congress-
man Mark Souder recognizing that biometric identification is not politically "palatable
yet").
266. See, e.g., Bangladesh Biometric Voter Identification Project Nearing Completion, Gov-
ernment Technology, http://www.govtech.com/gt/articles/374860 (last visited Nov. 30,
2009).
267. Peter P Swire & Cassandra Q. Butts, The ID Divide, CENTER FOR AMERICA
PROGREss 23-25 (June 2008) (describing some of the flaws with using biometrics as a tool
for identification).
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be deemed to "conform" to the names in the poll books.68 If Indiana's
law required an exact letter-by-letter match of the name on the voter list
and on the photo identification, then discretion in this aspect of voting
would be eliminated. Again, though, one would need to be careful
about the unintended consequences of requiring an exact match of
names, as some research in the voter registration context indicates that
requiring exact matches of names can lead to the disfranchisement of eli-
gible voters.2 70 Nevertheless, the broader point remains that legislators and
election administrators who create the rules for polling places should re-
view each aspect of polling place operation and create specific bright-line
• 271
rules wherever possible so as to reduce unconscious bias.
Create Fail-Safes for Prospective Voters. Unconscious bias can play a role
in the areas where poll workers have been given explicit discretion by the
legal and administrative regimes. But there are areas where poll workers
engage in what might be termed "softer" or "extra-legal" discretion. For
example, the law may require poll workers to find a voter's name in the
poll book. However, if poll workers have trouble finding the name, poll
workers have some discretion to decide how long they are going to take
to search for the name. A poll worker could take thirty seconds, a minute,
or five minutes to find a name. Importantly, the amount of time a poll
worker takes to find the name could differ based upon the racial or ethnic
characteristics of the voter-poll workers might take longer and make
more efforts to find White names than, say, African American names. As
268. Supra notes 88-96 and accompanying text. Another aspect of Indiana's photo
identification law relates to comparing the photograph on the identification with the
person presenting the photograph. Here, poll workers can exercise discretion when exam-
ining the photograph of the identification to determine if the person presenting the
photograph is the same person in the photograph.
269. Indeed, research shows that there is less disparity in poll worker application of
voter identification laws the more stringent the State's identification requirement. See
Stephen Ansolabehere, Is There Racial Discrimination at the Polls? Voters' Experiences in the
2008 Election 7-8 (Caltech/MIT Voting Tech. Project, Working Paper No. 73, 2009) ("In
States that have stricter ID laws, all groups of voters are asked to show identification at
approximately the same high rate ... [where] it is in the States without strict ID require-
ments that poll workers appear to use their discretion more."). While it is not clear what
causes this divergence between poll worker actions in States with strict identification laws
versus States with less strict identification laws, States with stricter identification require-
ments may leave less overall dejure discretion in the hands of poll workers.
270. See generally JUSTIN LEVITT ET AL., MAKING THE LIST: DATABASE MATCHING AND
VERIFICATION PROCESSES FORVOTER REGISTRATION (Brennan Center for Justice 2006), avail-
able at http://brennan.3cdn.net/96ee05284dfb6a6d5d-j4m6blcjs.pdf (last visited Jan. 8,
2009).
271. Some enforcement mechanism would likely also be necessary to ensure that poll
workers honor the bright-line rules. However, enforcement is not our focus.We are inter-
ested in those poll workers who act in good faith, but perhaps, unbeknownst to them, are
still making biased decisions. Poll workers who want to discriminate deliberately against
groups of voters would have less freedom of action, but, absent enforcement, would be
able to disregard the rules ensuring fairness.
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the Asian American Legal Defense and Education Fund recently noted,
they have "recorded many instances in which eligible voters have been
told their names are not [on] the rolls because frustrated poll workers do
not want to spend extra time seeking out 'foreign' sounding names or
reconciling identification inconsistencies. 272 Indeed, in one election an
Asian American voter came to a polling place, was told by poll workers he
was not on the list, was instructed to go to a different polling place, and
then two hours later returned to the first polling place where the poll
workers "suddenly" found his name.73
One of the ways to address this possible unconscious bias on the
part of poll workers would be to create fail-safes for voters in these
instances. One such fail-safe previously discussed, the ability to go to a
judge on election day for a quick ruling on eligibility, can provide a
back-up. Another fail-safe might be the possibility of election-day
registration. 27 4 If same-day registration were available, when a poll worker
could not find a name in the poll book, the voter would nonetheless have
the opportunity to register and cast a countable ballot on the spot.
Granted, poll workers might still not offer the option of same-day
registration to a voter due to bias, unconscious or otherwise, but this
could be mitigated by publicizing the right to register on election day.
Moreover, same-day registration may have other costs, such as increasing
the amount of "cognitive load" (which will be discussed in the next
section) of poll workers. Regardless, the existence of a fail-safe such as
same-day registration could limit the impact of unconscious bias on
election day.
Improve Polling Place Conditions. Various situational factors exacerbate
the risk of unconscious bias affecting decision-making. As previously
noted,275 when people are making decisions under time constraints they
are more likely to be affected by biases. In psychological terms, when un-
der pressure or any kind of cognitive load 27 6 people are less able to
272. Brief of Asian American Legal Defense and Education Fund as Amici Curiae in
Support of Petitioners at 22, Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008)
(Nos. 07-21,07-25).
273. Asian American Legal Defense and Education Fund, Asian American Access to
Democracy in the 2004 Elections, 17 (Aug. 2005).
274. A small but growing number of States offer the possibility of same-day registra-
tion. See, e.g.,Tokaji, supra note 205, at 48 nn. 376, 381 (listing States that offer election-day
registration).
275. See supra notes 186-191 and accompanying text.
276. Cognitive load is just the psychological term for having too many things to
think about or attend to. A technology oriented phrasing might use the term insufficient
cycles or bandwidth. In experiments, a psychologist might duplicate conditions of cogni-
tive load by requiring the participant to count backwards in threes. The unsurprising
corollary of this finding is that the more alert people are, the less likely they will use
stereotypes. See Galen V. Bodenhausen, Stereotypes as Judgmental Heuristics: Evidence of Cir-
cadian Variations in Discrimination, 1 PSYCHOL. Sci. 319,321 (1990).
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counteract the impact of unconscious bias. Thus, reducing time pressure
and cognitive load is beneficial"
With respect to time pressure, it seems a safe assumption that the
longer the line of voters, the more time pressure poll workers feel in mak-
ing their determinations. Thus, it may make sense to have more poll
workers at busy precincts or to reduce precinct size. In the alternative, it
may help if additional poll workers are utilized during peak voting hours
to reduce time pressure. Again, though, measures aimed at slowing down
the process from the perspective of the poll worker come with accompa-
nying costs, such as the need for more funds to pay additional poll
workers, and the need to recruit and train more poll workers-already a
difficult prospect in some places.
With respect to poll workers' cognitive loads, such loads could be
reduced by simplifying the operation of polling places.279 For example,
untrained and undertrained workers are asked to make complex comput-
erized voting machines work, often quickly.280  Not surprisingly,
occasionally the machines fail. If the machines do not work properly,
21
poll workers are expected to take action to make them work. And the
added brain power necessary to make the machines function increases the
risk of unconscious bias. Thus, using the simplest possible system for cast-
ing ballots might help reduce unconscious bias on election day. Put more
broadly, the more we can design polling places to ease the burden on poll
workers' minds, the less unconscious bias there will be.
Increase the Number of Minority Poll Workers. An increase in the per-
centage of minority poll workers might result in less overall differential
treatment between members of different racial groups. While research
shows that African Americans are not immune from implicit bias against
277. See Kunda & Spencer, supra note 192, at 535-36; John. A. Bargh & Tanya L.
Chartrand, The Unbearable Automaticity of Being, 54 AM. PSYCHOL. 462, 476 (1999) (stating
that "[t]o consciously and willfully regulate one's own ... evaluations [and] decisions ...
requires considerable effort and is relatively slow").
278. Reducing the number of voters on election day would achieve the same effect,
and may also be desirable if such voters became non-polling place voters instead. See supra
notes 260-264 and accompanying text (describing methods of non-polling place voting).
279. There is an analogy to aircraft cockpits and the control rooms of nuclear reac-
tors. In the early days of flying, cockpits consisted of numerous similar switches. Likewise,
control rooms at nuclear reactors involved many hard-to-distinguish switches. After con-
trols were simplified (i.e., made more intuitive), pilot and operator errors were significantly
reduced.
280. Frank Emmert et al., Trouble Counting Votes? Comparing Voting Mechanisms In The
United States And Selected Other Countries, 41 CREIGHTON L. Rv. 3, 18-19 (2007).
281. Michael J. Pitts, Heads or Tails?: A Modest Proposal for Deciding Close Elections, 39
CONN. L. Rav. 739,742 (2006) (describing failures of voting machines).
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African Americans, as you would expect, group members are generally
less biased against members of their own group.
282
This solution is no panacea, however. Sure enough, some research
indicates that both African American and White poll workers are more
likely to request identification from a potential African American than
from a potential White voter.:" The African American poll worker, how-
ever, is only 50 percent more likely to ask for identification from a
potential African American than a potential White voter, whereas the cor-
responding figure for a White poll worker is 85 percent.284 Similarly,
Latino poll workers were more likely to request identification from pro-
spective Latino voters than from prospective White voters, but by a factor
of less than 26%8.2' By contrast, White poll workers were 140% more
likely to request identification from potential Latino voters than potential
White voters.26
Increasing the number of minority workers in polling places, if it
also increases diversity in polling places, may also reduce poll workers'
unconscious bias.287 Researchers have demonstrated that the presence of a
person who shares the social characteristic of the person being evaluated
can reduce the decision-maker's bias.288 Mere exposure to members of
other groups when certain preconditions are met (of which equality is the
282. Brian A. Nosek et al., Harvesting Implicit Group Attitudes and Beliefs From a Dem-
onstration Website. 6 GROUP DYNAMICS: THEORY, RESEARCH AND PRACTICE 101, 105-06
(2002).
283. Alvarez et al, supra note 78, at 45. The research showed that in States with less
restrictive identification laws, White poll workers asked for identification at the following
rates: 20% for White prospective voters, 37% for African American prospective voters; and
48% for Latino prospective voters. Id. African American poll workers asked prospective
White voters for identification 30% of the time and asked prospective African American
voters for photo identification 45% of the time. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id. The research showed that Latino poll workers asked prospective White voters
for identification 43% of the time and asked prospective Latino voters for photo identifi-
cation 54% of the time. Id, For additional discussion of the different experiences of
minority and non-minority voters at the polls, see Ansolabehere, supra note 24 (discussing
the contrasting experiences of minority and non-minority voters at the polls).
286. See Alvarez, supra note 78. The study did not determine the rate at which Afri-
can American poll workers requested identification from Latino prospective voters, or the
rate at which Latino poll workers requested identification from African American prospec-
tive voters.
287. See, e.g., ALLPORT, supra note 220 (suggesting that contact between ingroups and
outgroups could reduce prejudice). There is some evidence that contact between minori-
ties and Whites can reduce conscious bias as well. See, e.g., Greg J. Duncan et al., Empathy
or Antipathy? The Consequences of Racially and Socially Diverse Peers on Attitudes and Behaviors,
(Northwestern University, Working Paper, 2003); Donald P. Green & Jannelle S. Wong,
Tolerance and the Contact Hypothesis: A Field Experiment, in THE POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY O
DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP (Eugene Borgina et al. eds., 2009).
288. See Lowery, supra note 140, at 842.
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most important), 28 9 reduces the impact of unconscious bias. However, in
order for this effect to occur, it is crucial that minority poll workers not
merely be represented at lower job levels within the polling place. 290
White supervisors and African American employees would be unlikely to
ameliorate the situation.
Wait and See. Given the current state of the psychological research, 29'
and inevitable concerns about the external validity of most psychological
292
experiments, perhaps any response should be delayed. There is always a
risk that costs, unidentified or otherwise, may outweigh benefits. After all,
with respect to benefits, some, looking at the overall size of the electorate,
might argue that unconscious bias does not represent a significant prob-
lem.293 For example, a study of the impact of photo identification in
Indiana found that in an election with about 1.7 million ballots cast, only
about 400 people cast a provisional ballot because of problems related to
294photo identification. Of course, this study likely underestimates the
number of voters rejected for lack of valid photo identification because in
some instances poll workers do not offer provisional ballots or prospective
voters refuse to fill out provisional ballots. 25 Nevertheless, it may be
289. See notes 221-226 and accompanying text.
290. See generally Thomas Pettrigrew & L.R. Tropp, A Meta-Analytic Test of Intergroup
Contact Theory, 90J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 751 (2006).
291. See Hart Blanton & James Jaccard, Unconscious Racism: A Concept in Pursuit of a
Measure, 34 ANN. REV. SOCIOL. 277, 292 (arguing that "strong conclusions are not war-
ranted at this time"). There remains a significant amount of controversy about the
meaning of this research. Compare Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race. 118 HARv. L. REv.
1489, 1541 (2005) ("There is now persuasive evidence that implicit bias against a social
category ... predicts disparate behavior toward individuals mapped to that category.") with
Gregory Mitchell & Philip E. Tetlock, Antidiscrimination Law and the Perils of Mindreading,
67 OHIO STATE L.J. 1023 (2006) (arguing that there is not yet sufficient understanding of
implicit bias to justify policy changes).
292. External validity refers to whether the results of a laboratory experiment can be
extended to a real world situation. One commonly noted criticism of most psychological
studies is that they are based on a population of college students rather than a representa-
tive sample of the general population. See, e.g., Blanton &Jaccard, supra note 291, at 292.A
conventional response is that this matters less for the kinds of research on fundamental
cognitive processes that we focus on here. In addition, there are now some studies based
on "real world" populations. See, e.g., Green, supra note 123; Dan-Olof Rooth, Implicit
Discrimination In Hiring: Real World Evidence, IZA Discussion Paper, http://ftp.iza.org/
dp2764.pdf (last visited Feb. 13, 2009).
293. Of course, even if unconscious bias affects a relatively small fraction of voters
and thus has little impact on the overall course of an election, it still may affect individual
voters. If we take seriously the rhetoric of having every vote count, then we should also
take seriously the risk that some do not count or are not counted for impermissible rea-
sons.
294. Pitts, supra note 66, at 480.
295. Such a study also does not show how many voters were allowed to cast a regular
ballot when they should have been offered a provisional ballot due to the operation of
unconscious bias in their favor.
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beneficial to take a wait-and-see approach before making changes in elec-
tion administration to reduce unconscious bias.
CONCLUSION
We have demonstrated that unconscious bias is likely a real phe-
nomenon with troubling implications for the administration of elections
in the United States. Poll workers may well have unconscious biases that
could lead to a disproportionate number of people from racial and ethnic
minority groups either not having their votes counted at all, or at the very
least, facing greater inconvenience to having their votes counted by being
shifted into the regime of provisional balloting. Unconscious bias could
also lead poll workers to allow White voters to cast illegitimate ballots or,
in the alternative, to cast regular ballots when a provisional ballot was the
correct option. Indeed, polling places on election day possess a number of
features that serve to exacerbate the opportunity for unconscious bias to
play a role: the need to make quick decisions with little individuating in-
formation and few concrete incentives for accuracy.
Unconscious biases, by their nature, are hard to counteract and it is
difficult at this point to put a firm number on how often unconscious bias
affects decisions made at polling places on election day. In some ways, one
can envision objections to many of our proposals for mitigating uncon-
scious bias as grand solutions to a possibly minor problem. For example,
an enormous change like same-day voter registration as a solution to the
problem of unconscious bias could be viewed as the equivalent of taking a
sledgehammer to kill a cockroach.
To such objections, we have two responses. The first response is that
voting is a fundamental right and concerns should be taken seriously
whenever any persons are denied this core democratic right-particularly
when such persons are members of racial and ethnic minority groups that
historically have faced discrimination. The second response is more subtle.
While it is true that election-day registration no doubt has other costs and
benefits not associated with unconscious bias, at the very least uncon-
scious bias provides an additional theoretical justification for election-day
registration. In other words, unconscious bias might not suffice as the sole
reason for implementing some of the proposals laid out above, but it
might serve as one of several reasons. At the very least, we would assert
that unconscious bias needs to be a part of the discussion when it comes
to determining how elections should be administered in the United
States.
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